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THE MONROE DOCTRINE

THE VITAL NECESSITY OF ITS CONTINUED MAINTENANCE

PUBLISHED BY THE
KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS HISTORICAL COMMISSION

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PREFACE

By Rear-Admiral W. S. Benson, U. S. N.

An earnest consideration of the Monroe Doctrine and a sincere appreciation of what it means to the United States is more imperative now than ever before.

There are at least four reasons which have prompted the Knights of Columbus Historical Commission to publish a monograph upon the "Monroe Doctrine" as its first offering to the Amercian public.

First: The declaration to the world contained in the Monroe Doctrine that the United States would not permit any non-American nation to intervene in American political affairs, and Washington's policy of American non-intervention in non-American affairs have been the keystone of our foreign policy since this country has had a foreign policy. These complementary principles which have controlled our relations with foreign powers have made the United States the great and powerful nation which it now is. The Monroe Doctrine, at all times, merits the most important thought of this country.

Second: The League of Nations Covenant, which was repudiated by the people of this country in the national election of 1921 has been adopted by the allied and victorious powers. That covenant provides in Article XXI, that

> "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace."

Some of the American nations and Canada, are members of the League of Nations.

Disputes arising between such American nations or between any of such American nations and any non-American nation, under the terms of the Covenant are within the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. Just how far the League of Nations might go in effectuating any League decision rendered in such a dispute is a question. Recently Bolivia requested the League to consider a revision of the Bolivian-Chilean treaty of 1904 covering certain territorial boundaries of Bolivia with reference to Tacna and Arica. Chile protested that any such action by the League would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. The League took no definite action, and after considerable objection Bolivia withdrew her request. Clearly, if the League attempted to modify the 1904 treaty and awarded to Bolivia any of the territory therein set forth as belonging to Chile, it would constitute a non-American intervention in American affairs to the

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detriment politically and territorially of Chile and hence an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. Such questions are likely to arise again, and it is possible that no such appeal as Chile recently made to the Monroe Doctrine may then be made. The United States therefore is most vitally interested at the present in the assertion and maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine.

Third: There is now pending before the Congress of the United States a bill to exempt American coastwise shipping from the payment of tolls for passage through the Panama Canal, Considerable objection is made to any such exemption on the ground that it would be a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901. The question of tolls is but an incident in the operation of the Canal, but the question of an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama and the Monroe Doctrine have been inextricably interwoven in the past and must necessarily be so interwoven in the future.

The Monroe Doctrine was intended as a self-protective measure for the United States. The Panama Canal to a very great degree was also so intended. Any diminution of the control of the United States over the Canal not only endangers the Monroe Doctrine but also endangers the future safety, peace and prosperity of the United States.

Fourth: President Harding has invited the great Powers to take part in a conference in Washington to discuss Limitation of Armaments and Far Eastern Questions. The Monroe Doctrine and the necessity for its maintenance will undoubtedly, be a controlling factor in determining the position of the United States with reference to disarmament.

The Knights of Columbus Historical Commission, therefore, deems it most appropriate to present this discussion of the Monroe Doctrine at the present time. The author, Mr. Thomas H. Mahony, Assistant District Attorney of Boston, claims no originality in the discovery of the material used or treated. He presents an arrangement of the materials already at hand and accessible to anybody, which sets forth and emphasizes the American aspect of the Monroe Doctrine. It is that American aspect which the Knights of Columbus Historical Commission intends to offer in all its publications dealing with American History, to stimulate a deep, sincere, and nation-wide spirit of patriotism to the end that the United States may continue its mission of holding aloft the torch of freedom for all peoples.

W. S. BENSON.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

Summary

Chapter I.—The Principle Involved. PAGE

The United States as well as other nations possess the right of self-protection and of self-preservation..... 7

Chapter II.—Its Early Application.

In the exercise of this right, President Washington inaugurated the policy of isolation from European political affairs..... 12

Chapter III.—Our Foreign Policy Prior to 1823.

The complementary policy of preventing non-American intervention in American political affairs, was hinted at by Washington, and actually applied by President Madison in the matter of West Florida..... 17

Chapter IV.—The Holy Alliance and its Menace to the United States through the Spanish-American Colonies and the Oregon Controversy with Russia.

The menace to popular government from the Holy Alliance and Russia's claim to Oregon presented a situation in 1823 which called for a definite application of this second principle. 23

Chapter V.—Great Britain and Her Desire for a Joint Declaration with the United States.

Great Britain's Ministry, while sympathizing with the anti-republican principles of the Holy Alliance nevertheless feared French political ascendency in Europe and commerical ascendency in the Spanish-American colonies, and sought a joint declaration with the United States opposing intervention by France and the Holy Alliance in the affairs of the rebellious Spanish-American Colonies..... 33

Chapter VI.—Its Refusal.

The United States Refused to Enter into any such joint Declaration with Great Britain..... 39

Chapter VII.—The Message to Congress.

The United States, through President Monroe, proclaimed to the world the determination to prevent any European nation from future colonization in, or extension of its political system to the Western Hemisphere..... 45

Chapter VIII.—The Doctrine Tested.

The "Monroe Doctrine" has been tested at various times by France, Spain, Germany, Great Britain and Japan, but the United States has resolutely maintained this policy to the present time..... 47

Summary—Continued

Chapter IX.—Comments, Criticisms and Fallacies. PAGE

Many mistakes and misinterpretations have arisen relative to the Monroe Doctrine such as the following: 67

A. That George Canning, the British statesman, was the author of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the British fleet has ever supported it.

B. That the Monroe Doctrine has been changed or extended beyond its original scope.

C. That the Monroe Doctrine is a guaranty given by the United States to Spanish America.

D. That the Monroe Doctrine has not been consistently applied by the United States.

E. That the Monroe Doctrine is a prohibition against the acquisition of new territory by the United States.

Chapter X.—The Future of the Monroe Doctrine.

The future of the Monroe Doctrine in effect must resolve itself into one of the following policies:..... 85

A. Its absolute abandonment.

B. It continued assertion and maintenance by the United States acting alone.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

CHAPTER I—THE PRINCIPLE INVOLVED

The United States as well as other nations possess the right of self-protection and of self-preservation.

For the last three or four years the Monroe Doctrine has been most prominent in the discussion of world politics. The Peace Conference at Versailles, the League of Nations Covenant, and more recently the Limitation of Armaments Conference have all shared in the responsibility for directing public attention to the Monroe Doctrine. What it is, how it came into existence, and what is to be its future are questions of great interest to all students of international affairs, and questions of vital importance to all Americans.

The Monroe Doctrine has been defined or described in many ways, and by many people. Ex-President Taft described it in the following way:

> "The Monroe Doctrine in spirit and effect is a policy of the United States which forbids any non-American nation, by external aggression, by purchase or by intrigue, to acquire the territory in whole or in part, of any country or nation in this Western Hemisphere."[1]

It has also been defined or described thus:

> "A prohibition of the United States of European interference with the political arrangements of the New World."[2]

> "The policy by which the United States opposes any acts that it considers as 'oppressing' or 'controlling the destiny of' the Latin American states."[3]

> "It is a declaration of the United States that certain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States, and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly. The declaration does not say what the course of the United States would be in case such acts are done. That is left to be determined in each particular instance. . . . The doctrine rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law. . . . It does not assert or imply or involve any right on the part of the United States to impair or

[1] *Taft Papers on League of Nations*, p. 292.
[2] W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 3.
[3] R. D. Armstrong, *Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Abandoned*,—10 American Journal International Law, p. 77.

control the independent sovereignty of any American State. . . .The scope of the doctrine is strictly limited. It concerns itself only with the occupation of territory in the New World to the subversion or exclusion of a pre-existing American Government."[1]

These definitions and descriptions set forth the unilateral character of the Monroe Doctrine, in its enunication and maintenance for the security of the United States, only.

On the other hand, Lord Bryce, former British Minister at Washington argues that the Monroe Doctrine,

"was originally delivered as announcing a restriction or limitation which America proposed to place on her own action. She would not interefere in the wars and alliances of the Old World and she expected that in return the States of the Old World would not interfere in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere."[2]

As will be pointed out, there is no foundation of historical fact which justifies any such conclusion as that drawn by Lord Bryce. On the contrary, the evidence warrants but one conclusion as to this question, viz., that the Monroe Doctrine was based upon the right of this country to self-protection, that it was intended solely for that purpose, and that no obligations to any other power were assumed in its pronouncement.

Many authors contend that the Monroe Doctrine has not attained the status of international law. Among such critics may be mentioned Ex-President Taft,[3] Elihu Root,[4] W. F. Reddaway,[5] and H. Bingham.[6]

On the other hand President Cleveland in his special message to Congress on the Venezuela question, stated most emphatically that while

"It may not have been admitted in so many words to the Code of International law, . . . if the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine is something we may justly claim it has its place in the code of international law as certainly and as securely as if it was specifically mentioned. . . .

"The Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced. . . ."[7]

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[1]E. Root, *Addresses on International Subjects*, pp. 109–117.

[2]*The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations*,—The Nation, Dec. 13, 1917.

[3]*Taft Papers on League of Nations*, p. 120.

[4]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 111.

[5]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 103–113.

[6]H. Bingham, *The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth*, Atlantic Monthly, June, 1913.

[7]Special Message to Congress, Dec. 17, 1895—J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IX, 655.—J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, VI, 577, 578.

Richard Olney, President Cleveland's Secretary of State, with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, said that,

> "The rule thus defined has been the accepted public law of this country ever since its promulgation."[1]

So far as the United States is concerned the Monroe Doctrine is, and must remain a principle of International Law, if there is any International Law, and in any event must be accepted as a principle controlling international relations. It will have the force of such a principle until such time as the United States shall be unable to supply the force necessary for its maintenance.

Practically all students of the political history of the United States agree that the Monroe Doctrine is based upon the right of national self-protection, which right is recognized by international law.[2] In order to secure a proper perspective for the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, a short glance at this principle of self-protection and its application will not be amiss.

Every sovereign State possesses as incidental to such sovereignty the right of self-defense and of self-preservation.[3] A sovereignty without such right is an absurdity. As deeply rooted as is the desire for self-preservation in the individual, just so deeply rooted is the same desire, but raised to a national degree, in the State. Just as the individual's right of self-preservation is recognized in national law, so is the State's right of a similar nature recognized in what we call international law.

In national courts of law the right of self-defense justifies an individual in anticipating attack.

> "One is not obliged to wait until he is struck by an impending blow; for, if a weapon be raised in order to shoot or strike, or the danger of other personal violence be imminent, the party is such imminent danger may protect himself by striking the first blow for the purpose of repelling and preventing the attempted injury."[4]

The same right of States to anticipate injurious attack, and to go beyond their jurisdictional territory in exercising such right is recognized internationally.[5] Of this there are many

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[1]Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895—Senate Ex. Documents, 31–54th Congress, 1st Session, p. 4.

[2]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 111.
J. W. Foster, *Century of American Diplomacy*, p. 477.
A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 75, 80.
H. Taylor, *International Public Law*, p. 405.

[3]H. Taylor, *International Public Law*, p. 405, sec. 401; C. H. Stockton, *International Law*, pp. 97–109; Creasy, *International Law*, p. 149.

[4]*Words and Phrases Judicially Used*, 2nd series, IV., 509; *State v. Wilson*, (Delaware), 62 Atlantic Reporter, pp. 227, 231.

[5]Oppenheim, *International Law*, 3d ed. I., 214.
Creasy, *International Law*, p. 153.
Vattel, III., ch. 3, secs. 42–49.
R. Phillimore, *Int. Law*, I., 216.
H. Taylor, *International Public Law*, pp. 422, 426.

illustrations. The mobilization of forces upon a State's frontier by a neighboring State justifies defensive mobilization and even war by the former against the latter. Again, if one nation is attempting, directly or indirectly, to seize or occupy sites of great military strategical value, and such occupation is considered by another nation as threatening the existence of the latter, it might properly object to such occupation, and go to war if necessary to prevent it.[1] In the exercise of this right Great Britain in 1911 objected to Germany's occupation of a naval station on the Coast of Morocco. So, too, Great Britain in the past objected to Russia's occupation of Constantinople. In fact, the whole theory of the Balance of Power is based upon this principle.[2]

It must be noted at once, however, that in the present condition of international relations, International Law as enforceable law, like national law, does not really exist. There is no underlying sanction for it,[3] such as there is for all national law in the supreme authority of the State, arising directly from its people. There is no international legislature to enact international laws, no international executive to enforce them, and no international courts to administer them with power to enforce their decrees. Strictly speaking, therefore, in the absence of such sanction there is no such thing as international law at the present time, at least no international law upon which alone a state might safely rely for its protection and preservation.[4] The force underlying what we know as international law is merely the public opinion of the world, the comity of nations and nothing more.[5] Public morality, however, has never been sufficient to control the actions of the populations of States, and is not sufficient to control the actions of States.

In the past the nation having power to enforce its demands has had the basis or results of such demands incorporated, to some extent, into what we call International Law.[6] In times of national stress, however, even the few rules or maxims, regarded as approaching an international code, have been disregarded with impunity by nations which feared no disadvantageous or disproportionate results from such disregard. For example, Great Britain entirely disregarded our rights as neutrals on the sea in the French-English wars of 1793 and

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[1]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 111.

[2]Creasy, *Int. Law*, pp. 151, 279.
H. Taylor, *Int. Pub. Law*, pp. 425, 426.

[3]A. J. Balfour, *The British Blockade* (1915), p. 10.

[4]Austin, *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, VI.

[5]C. H. Stockton, *Int. Law*, p. 1; Pomeroy, *Int. Law*, p. 14; Oppenheim, *Int. Law*, 3d ed., pp. 1, 14, 15; Creasy, *Int. Law*, p. 1.

[6]A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 81.

1803.[1] In the World War, Germany disregarded such rules of war as referred to blockades, to bombing of unfortified places, and to search of merchant vessels before sinking. Great Britain, to the disadvantage of the United States, and in violation of the provisions of the Declaration of London (1909), by Orders in Council of August 20, 1914, October 29, 1914, March 11, 1915, and March 23, 1915, deliberately disregarded the rules of contraband, neutral trade and blockade.[2]

A State, therefore to retain its economic and political independence, must be prepared to enforce its rights, for so far, International Law has not furnished sufficient guaranties. A sovereign State at all times must be the sole judge of whether its safety is or is not threatened, and of what action it will take.[3] To argue otherwise would be a denial of sovereignty. In the last analysis, it will always be a question of the potential energy possessed by that State which will control the necessity and the character of any action to be taken.

The United States, as a sovereign State possess the sole and unqualified right to say when, where or how their safety or their existence is endangered by the action or threatened action of any other State. They possess the absolute right to take any action which they may deem proper, to prevent the arising of such danger or to remove it if it has already arisen. The practical question at any given time will be whether the United States has the power to carry out their desires, and to enforce their demands, for if at any time they are in such a condition that any foreign nation, with which they have as a dispute, believes itself powerful enough to disregard those desires or demands, or actually to overcome the United States by force of arms, then it is absolutely certain that no mere declaration of principle, or verbal objection, however strongly phrased, will be sufficient to protect the United States.[4]

President Roosevelt pointed this out in his message of December 2, 1902 relative to the Monroe Doctrine wherein he stated that,

> "The Monroe Doctrine should be treated as the cardinal feature of American foreign policy; but it would be worse than idle to assert it unless we intended to back it up."[5]

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[1]H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II, 171, 172.

A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 6–29.

[2]E. J. Clapp, *Economic Aspects of the War*, pp. 1–108, appendix 312–316; see also A. J. Balfour *The British Blockade* (1915).

The Declaration of London set forth rules of naval warfare which Great Britain and the other nations there represented agreed were "actual principles of international law," C. H. Stockton, *Int. Law*, pp. 57–58, App. IV., 535–549.

[3]E. Root, *Addresses on International Subjects*, p. 111.

[4]P. F. Martin, "*Maximilian in Mexico*," 415.

[5]J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, p. 6762.

CHAPTER II—ITS EARLY APPLICATION

In the exercise of this right President Washington inaugurated the policy of isolation from European political affairs.

When the American Revolution ended, the American Colonies were recognized as constituting a new and distinct nation with all the rights of sovereignty, a republican form of government, unusual in the world of that period, was adopted by the American people. At first a loosely federated system was attempted, but later, the Constitution was adopted, creating the representative democracy which we now have. At that time the European world was monarchical and autocratic in character. Russia, Holland, Spain, Portugal, France and Great Britain all had colonies in the Western Hemisphere. Some of these nations looked with jealous eyes at the United States, and all of them, with the possible exception of France, were opposed to republicanism.

This new venture of republicanism was, therefore, confronted with many dangers. The success of the Revolution was not hoped by the European nations, and was not believed by England, to be permanent.[1] The same international jealousies, manifested by the European Powers in Europe, were reflected in the control of their colonies.

The continued existence of the Republic of the United States was at best precarious. If the experiment was to succeed, and if representative government was to survive, it was necessary to take all possible precautions to anticipate and to prevent the arising of any circumstances which might tend to destroy or endanger to it.

It was apparent from the beginning that the greatest menace to the United States lay in the colonies of the European nations upon its borders.[2] Great Britain, in open violation of the Treaty of 1783, by retaining the fortified posts along our northern frontier, threatened trouble at any time.[3] Spain held the west bank of the Mississippi River and closed that river to navigation,[4] and also endeavored to alienate the west-

[1]Woodrow Wilson, *George Washington*, pp. 248, 249.
H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II, 170, 175.
Such opinion has been entertained more recently. See A. Carnegie, *The Reunion of Britain and America—North Am. Review*, June, 1893.

[2]H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II, 133.
J. B. Moore, *Four Phases of American Development*, p. 149.

[3]Bancroft, *History of United States*, VI, 463.
H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II, 175, 176.
W. Wilson, *George Washington*, 302.
John Marshall, *George Washington*, p. 255.

[4]H. C. Lodge, *Washington*, II, 133; J. Marshall, *George Washington*, p. 269, 270.

ern population from this nation. Neither of these nations was averse to inciting the Indian tribes along our border to serve their own purposes. Everything was done to render as difficult as possible the progress of this country.[1] In the Caribbean Sea, Great Britain, by hampering our trade and holding strategical places, as well as Spain and France by occupation of other similar strategical points, threatened the future safety of the United States. Even before his election to the presidency, Washington believed that national security lay in isolation from European political affairs.[2]

While the United States were developing, and while the various phases of national live were being consolidated, Washington was of the opinion that they must be kept free of any disputes between the various European nations or their colonies; moreover, he believed that all attempts of these same European nations to meddle in the affairs of the United States, or tending to endanger their political or territorial integrity, must, if possible, be prevented and, in any event, most bitterly opposed.

Washington on January 1, 1788, wrote to Jefferson as follows:

> "Our situation is such, as makes it not only unnecessary but extremely imprudent, for us to take part in their quarrels; and whenever a contest happens among them, if we wisely and properly improve the advantages which nature has given us, we may be benefited by their folly, provided we conduct ourselves with circumspection."[3]

Washington in 1788 writing to Sir Edward Newenham observed:

> "I hope that the United States of America will be able to keep disengaged from the labyrinth of European politics and wars; and that before long they will, by the adoption of a good national government, have become respectable in the eyes of the world, so that none of the maritime powers, especially none of those who hold possessions in the New World or the West Indies, shall presume to treat them with insult or contempt."[4]

In these letters Washington showed clearly that this principle of national self-preservation even at that time had assumed in his mind a definite form, and had become the well-defined system, which, as President, he later followed.

As one of his first executive acts, he carefully examined and noted all the foreign correspondence in the Government archives. He realized the dangers to the United States from the European nations with colonies along our borders, and became convinced that the United States should not become

[1]H. C. Lodge, *Washington*, II. 86, 87, 90, 133, 172, 175.
[2]H. C. Lodge *Washington*, II., 139, 141.
[3]J. Sparks, *Writings of George Washington*, IX., 291–294.
[4]*Ibid*, IX., 398–402:

entangled in the affairs of the European nations and should insist at all times upon being accorded all the rights of a sovereign nation.[1] The foreign policy of Washington's administration, based upon isolation from European entanglements, the result of sound logic and sober thinking was matured at the outset, to be applied from time to time as the occasion arose.[2]

Two striking instances in our early history may be cited in illustration of these points. The first, illustrative of Washington's policy, involved our refusal to be drawn into the European War of 1793.

In 1789 the people of France, inspired by the success of the American Revolution, and of representative government, overturned the monarchy and set up in its place a republic. In 1793 France and England were at war and the former sought our aid. At that time treaties were in force between France and the United States, which provided, among other things, for the payment of our Revolutionary debt to France, for the guaranty of her possessions on this continent, and for a defensive alliance.[3] The United States was in very great danger of being drawn into the war by reason of the hostile activities of both belligerents, and at a time when every consideration for its future security demanded that it avoid participation.[4]

Washington, while gratefully remembering the French assistance during the Revolution, and mindful of the existing treaties with that country, nevertheless, interested in the welfare of the United States above all else,[5] pointed out that it was not a defensive war, such as was covered by the treaty, and proclaimed the neutrality of the United States on April 22, 1793.

This Proclamation of Neutrality was followed in 1794 by the enactment by Congress of the Neutrality Act, the first of its kind among modern nations, which imposed upon every person

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[1]H. C. Lodge, *Washington* II., 132, 133, 137, 143.

[2]*Ibid*, II, 139, 141; Bancroft, *Hist. of U. S.*, VI., 469.

[3]H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II., 166, 167.

Treaties and conventions concluded between U. S. and other powers since July 4, 1776, pp. 241-254.

[4]"The minds of the people are so much agitated, and resentments are so warm that there is reason to fear that we shall be hurried into the torrent that is ravaging Europe." Letter of March 24, 1794, J. Coit, Member of Congress, to D. L. Coit,—Gilman's, *James Monroe*, p. 45.

"'Tis perhaps fortunate for us that we are ill-treated by both the belligerent powers; experiencing no favor from either, we shall be less an object of jealousy from either, and probably less in danger of rushing into the war than if we were ill-treated by one only. I believe we had better suffer almost anything than get into the war. . . . " Letter March 25, 1794, Joshua Coit, to Daniel L. Coit—Gilman's *James Monroe*, p. 44.

[5]"All our late accounts from Europe hold up the expectation of a general war in that quarter. For the sake of humanity, I hope such an event will not take place; but, if it should, I trust that we shall have too just a sense of our own interest to originate any cause, that may involve us in it." Washington to D. Humphreys, March 23, 1793, J. Sparks, *Writings of George Washington*, X., 331: W. C. Ford, *Writings of George Washington*, XII., 276.

in the United States, the obligation to refrain from any act, therein set forth and defined as unneutral, against any nation with which the United States was at peace.[1]

The second instance referred to, involved the War of 1812. Upon the renewal of war between France and Great Britain in 1803, the latter announced wholesale blockades of French ports,[2] and in addition, ordered the seizure of all neutral ships, wherever found, trading with an enemy,[3] denying them the right to enter any harbor on great stretches of the European oast.[4]

In 1807 Great Britain promulgated the "Orders in Council," intending to prohibit all neutral vessels from the use of the oceans, save such as traded directly with England or its colonies.[5] All this time Napoleon was replying with "orders" and "decrees" of a like nature.[6] Both belligerents by such acts violated the sovereignty of this country and injured it more than they injured all other neutral countries combined.[7] American vessels were seized by both belligerents, but by reason of Great Britain's mastery of the seas, the United States suffered more severely by the lawless seizures of that nation.[8] In effect, American ports were blockaded.[9]

Great Britain forcibly impressed at least 20,000 American seamen into her service,[10] on the theory that a person, once a British subject, could not expatriate himself, and as a corollary, that the British Government could seize anybody, attempting to do so, wherever found, and forcibly compel him to serve Great Britain in any way that nation or its agents might require.[11] The United States insisted that, as a neutral, they had the right to trade unhampered with other neutrals, and, under the proper restrictions as to contraband, had the right to trade with either belligerent; they further insisted that Great Britain had no right whatever, forcibly to impress nationals of the United States into British service.

Great Britain, by her insistence upon this alleged right of "Impressment," practically proclaimed the right to British

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[1]aAct of June 5, 1794—I. Stat. at Large, p. 381, ch. 50.

[2]Harrowby's Circular, Aug. 9, 1804; *Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations*, III., 266.

[3]Hawkesbury's Instructions, Aug. 17, 1805; *Ibid*, 266.

[4]Fox to Monroe, April 8, 1805, and Nov. 11, 1805; *Ibid* 267.

[5]Orders in Council, Jan. 1807, and Nov. 11, 1807, *Ibid*, pp. 267–273.

[6]The Berlin Decree, Nov. 21, 1806; *Ibid*, pp. 290–291.

The Milan Decree, Dec. 17, 1807; *Ibid*, p. 290.

[7]A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 7.

[8]H. Adams, *Hist. of U. S.*, V. 31; Rept. Secy. of St., July 6, 1812, *Am. St. Pap. Foreign Relations*, III. 583–585.

[9]Channing, *Jeffersonian System*, pp. 184–194.

See generally on War of 1812, A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, Vol. IV.

[10]T. Roosevelt, *Naval War of 1812*, p. 42; H. Adams, *Hist. of U. S.*, III., 202.

[11]John Lowell, *Review of Treatise on Expatriation*, by a "Massachusetts Lawyer."

control of the oceans whenever Great Britain cared to assert it, and the right to destroy American commerce without recompense. This infringed upon the sovereign right of the United States, and if allowed to go unchallenged, not only would injure their dignity, but actually endanger their very existence. While the United States had ample cause for war against France, that nation did not resort to impressment, and Great Britain's activities by reason of her control of the sea, made a more direct and harassing contact, and aroused this country, then under a Republican administration, to self-protective action.

Henry Clay, the great champion of Americanism stirred the patriotism of this country as it had not been stirred since the Revolution. In the United States Senate on February 22, 1810, he argued:

> "Have we not been for years contending against the tyranny 'of the ocean' . . . We have . . . tried peaceful resistance . . . When this is abandoned without effect, I am for resistance by the sword."[1]

Two years later while speaker of the House of Representatives he said:

> "The real cause of British aggression was not to distress an enemy, but to destroy a rival."[2]

The United States thus aroused to action in the defense of their rights, dignity and existence, declared war on Great Britain on June 18, 1812.

In the first instance referred to, the United States manifested their determination to pursue as their policy with reference to foreign nations the principle of absolute non-intervention in European affairs, and of complete freedom from entangling alliances, while in the second, was made clear their refusal to allow without challenge any nation directly or indirectly to attack the sovereignty or dignity of the United States.[3]

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[1] *Annals, 11th Cong. 3rd Session*, pp. 579–582.

[2] *Annals, 12th Cong. 1st. Session*, p. 601.

[3] See also the controversy of 1789–1790 relative to Nootka Sound; J. Marshall, *George Washington*, pp. 284–285; J. S. Bassett, *The Federalist System*, pp. 59–60; Manning, *Nootka Sound Controversy*, in *American Historical Association Report*, 1904, pp. 279–478; Ford's *Writings of Jefferson*, V., 199–203, 238; C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 88–92, 100.

CHAPTER III—OUR FOREIGN POLICY PRIOR TO 1823

The complementary policy of preventing non-American intervention in American political affairs, was hinted at by Washington, and actually applied by President Madison in the matter of West Florida.

The events in the early history of the United States show an appreciation of, and an earnest effort upon the part of those entrusted with government to follow the principles of foreign policy just considered as well as a ready and active response upon the part of the nation.

Washington's convictions have already been referred to. These were emphasized by him in his "Farewell Address" in which he gave his parting injunction to the country in the following words:

> "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible . . .
>
> "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificialties, in the ordinary vissicitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
>
> "Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance . . .
>
> "Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, interest, humour, or caprice?
>
> "'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it. . . ."[1]

According to a British writer on the Monroe Doctrine, Washington, in this message, bequeathed to his country, "a policy which above all things may be called American."[2] This

[1]Ford's *Writings of Washington*, XIII, 311–318.
J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, I., 222, 223.
[2]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 10.

policy, unheard of before in international affairs, placed the country outside the toils of European greed, ambition and treachery. From this policy the Monroe Doctrine naturally developed.[1]

Washington's successors also followed these principles and manifested their belief in them by many statements and actions.

John Adams in 1782, said,

> "It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually with us, to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power . . . But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle . . ."[2]

Adams also said that,

> "America has been long enough involved in the wars of Europe. She has been a football between contending nations from the beginning, and it is easy to foresee, that France and England both will endeavor to involve us in their future wars. It is our interest and duty to avoid them as much as possible, and to be completely independent, and to have nothing to do with either of them, but in commerce."[3]

In the Nootka Sound Controversy, in 1790, Adams declared in favor of refusing Great Britain permission to send troops through the United States to attack the Spanish colony of Louisiana.[4]

Long afterward on September 30, 1805, in a letter to Dr. Rush, John Adams referred to his foreign policy when President, in these words:

> "The principle of foreign affairs, which . . . has been the invariable guide of my conduct in all situations . . . was, that we should make no treaties of alliance with any foreign power; . . . that we should separate ourselves, as far as possible and as long as possible, from all European politics and wars . . . "[5]

Jefferson, referring to the same policy, said:

> "I had ever dreamed it fundamental to the United States never to take an active part in the quarrels of Europe . . . "[6]

This policy of abstention from European politics was early recognized by others as being the logical policy of the United

[1]H. C. Lodge, *Washington*, II., 141, 143: Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895, *Sen. Ex. Doc. 31,—54th Cong. 1st sess.*, p. 4.
[2]J. Adams, *Diary*, Nov. 18, 1782.
[3]J. Adams, *Works*, VIII, 9, 497, 599.
[4]C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 82–92, 100.
[5]John Adams, *Works*, I, 200.
[6]Letter to Monroe of June 11, 1823: Jefferson's *Works*, VII., 287.

States. Thomas Pownall, appointed Governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1757, later Governor of New Jersey, and Governor of South Carolina, after his return to England wrote of the United States in 1781, as follows:

> "As nature separated her from Europe, and hath established her alone on a great continent, far removed from the old world and all its embroiled interests, it is contrary to the nature of her existence, and consequently to her interest, that she should have any connections of Politics with Europe other than merely commerical . . . "[1]

The second phase of this foreign policy, that of refusing to allow European nations to meddle with American affairs, which was definitely proclaimed by Monroe in 1823, manifested itself very early in Washington's administration. If the policy was not definitely announced at that time, at least the germ from which the final announcement developed was present.[2]

On June 21, 1792, while the United States was having difficulty with the Indians, who were countenanced and aided, indirectly if not directly, by Spain and Great Britain,[3] Washington wrote Governeur Morris, who was then on an unofficial mission to England, as follows:

> "One thing, however, I must not pass over in silence, lest you should infer from it, that Mr. D. had authority for reporting, that the United States had asked the mediation of Great Britain to bring about a peace between them and the Indians. You may be fully assured, Sir, that such mediation never was asked, that the asking of it never was in contemplation, and I think I might go further and say, that it not only never will be asked, but would be rejected if offered. The United States will never have an occasion, I hope, to ask for the interposition of that power, or any other to establish peace within their own territory."[4]

This phase of the foreign policy was more clearly defined, and more forcibly put forward during Madison's administration. Late in 1810 Spanish subjects seized Baton Rouge and declared it independent. The United States, against the protest of Great Britain, occupied West Florida, pending the settlement of the question of navigation of the Mississippi which had been closed by the Spaniards. Madison was informed and believed that Spain was about to sell West Florida. In a

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[1]T. Pownall, *A Memorial to the Sovereigns of Europe on the State of Affairs between the Old and the New World.*

[2]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 3, 11.
See also on Nootka Sound Controversy as bearing on this point, C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy*, pp. 88–92, 100.

[3]H. C. Lodge, *Washington*, II., 86, 87, 90.

[4]J. Sparks, *Writings of George Washington*, X., 239.
W. C. Ford, *Writings of George Washington*, XII., 132–133.

message to Congress on January 3, 1811, he set forth most clearly this second principle, in the following words:

> "Taking into view the tenor of these several communications, the posture of things with which they are connected, the intimate relations of the country adjoining the United States eastward of the Perdido River to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of Congress the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring territory in which they have in different respects, so deep and so just a concern pass from the hands of Spain into those of any other power."[1]

Acting upon this recommendation Congress passed the following resolution:

> "Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain, and of her American provinces, and considering the influence which the destiny of the territory adjoining the southern border of the United States may have upon their security, tranquillity and commerce, therefore
>
> "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled,
>
> "That the United States, under the peculiar circumstances of the existing crisis, cannot, without serious inquietude, see any part of the said territory pass into the hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory."[2]

It is clear, therefore, that as early as 1792 in Washington's administration, one of these two principles of foreign policy, based solely upon the right of national self-preservation, had become crystallized into a definite system, and the other at least suggested.[3] By 1811 both principles had become fixed and might be put into these words:

A—No American intereference in European affairs; or "America, hands off Europe."

B—No European interference in American affairs, or "Europe, hands off America."

These two principles in no way conflict with any line of action the United States might take with reference to consolidating its own territory, or with reference to extending its

[1] J. D. Richardson's *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, I., 488.

[2] *U. S. Stat. at Large*, III., 471: *Am. St. Papers, For. Rel.*, III., 571.

[3] T. B. Edington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 92.
H. C. Lodge, *Washington*, II., 141, 143, 213–215.
W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 10.

boundaries, by purchase, cession, annexation or otherwise. There is nothing contained in the two principles cited which would prevent the United States from annexing Texas or Hawaii upon the request of their respective peoples, or from acquiring by purchase Florida, Louisiana, Alaska, the Virgin Islands, and the Panama Canal Zone, or from securing by cession California, Porto Rico, and the Philippines. As Washington said in 1783, "The . . . true interest of this country must be measured by a continental scale."[1] Washington's efforts as President and those of his immediate successors were directed toward extending the country's boundaries west and south to the natural boundaries of the seas.

The question of our territorial expansion, as will be shown later, is not involved in the Monroe Doctrine. It must be regarded and treated as a matter entirely distinct and in no way conflicting with the Monroe Doctrine.

[1]Washington to Lafayette, April 7, 1783—Sparks, *Writings of Washington*, VIII., 412; Bancroft, *History of the U. S.*, VI., 83.

CHAPTER IV—THE HOLY ALLIANCE AND ITS MENACE TO THE UNITED STATES THROUGH THE SPANISH-AMERICAN COLONIES AND THE OREGON CONTROVERSY WITH RUSSIA

The menace to popular government from the Holy Alliance and Russia's claim to Oregon presented a situation in 1823 which called for a definite application of this second principle.

Such was the status of the foreign policy of the United States when two grave dangers confronted it in 1823, arising out of matters concerning foreign affairs, firstly with the Quadruple or Holy Alliance and secondly with Russia.

When Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808 and forced her King, Charles IV, as well as Prince Ferdinand forever to renounce the Spanish Crown, and bestowed it upon his own brother, Joseph Bonaparte, he unknowingly aroused the dormant spirit of Spanish nationalism, which manifested itself in open rebellion.[1] Provisional juntas in opposition to the new king were established in the various provinces of Spain. Thereupon the Spanish colonies on the American continents which for many years had been chafing under the Spanish connection, particularly by reason of Spain's oppressive measures against the native Indians,[2] and her commercial, political and economic regulations which hindered the development of those colonies,[3] began to set up provincial governments, entirely indedendent of either government then attempting to function in Spain. All the Spanish colonies of South America, with the exception of lower Peru, declared their independence about the same time. Under San Martin in Argentine, O'Higgins, Rosas, and the Carrera Brothers in Chili, Bolivar and Marino in Venezuela, the revolutions were carried on with varying success, until after the restoration of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne, it became apparent that Spain could not recover her former colonies.[4]

Henry Clay, the great American champion of the South American republics, worked incessantly for their recognition by the United States. He saw as clearly, if not more clearly than did anybody else, the great effect which such a recognition would have in securing for all time the political and territorial integrity of the United States. He believed and stated as early as 1818 that there was no other question of our foreign policy in which we had so much at stake in the matter of our politics,

[1] J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America*, p. 27.

[2] *Ibid*, pp. 5, 6.

[3] *Ibid*, pp. 5–7; Hall's *Journal on Chili, Peru and Mexico.* (1824—Edinburgh) I., 249, 296.

[4] J. H. Latané, *The United States and Latin America*, pp. 25–48.

commerce and navigation, and that South America once independent would be guided by an American policy.[1] Spurred on apparently by the untiring efforts of Clay,[2] President Monroe, on March 8, 1822, in a special message to Congress, expressed the opinion that the time had arrived for such recognition and asked for an appropriation sufficient to effectuate it. An appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) was accordingly made.

Such were the relations between the United States and the South American as well as the Central American nations, when the Quadruple Alliance began to cast its shadow across the Atlantic. This Alliance, popularly called the Holy Alliance developed from the Napoleonic Wars.

After Napoleon was finally driven from Europe, the European powers at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, acting under such high-sounding phrases as "Reconstruction of Social Order," and "Regulation of the Political System of Europe," parceled out to the various conquering nations what had been taken from vanquished France.[3] The dread of another return by that master soldier, who to the Allies symbolized the French Revolution, the Convention, and hence opposition to "Legitimacy," coupled with the fear of a growing demand by people everywhere[4] for participation in their government, particularly felt in France,[5] in England,[6], in Germany,[7] and in Italy,[8] induced Great Britain, Russia, Prussia, and Austria to organize the Quadruple Alliance which was probably the most powerful and efficient international combination ever created for the purpose of controlling the destinies of the world, and for maintaining as the sole basis of lawful government the principle of "Legitimacy," or the divine right of kings to rule, and to hold all the territory ruled over by them in fee simple.[9] Upon this principle the Treaty of Vienna was based, in entire disregard of the world-wide agitation for representative government, characterized by Metternich in his "Confession of Faith," as "Presumption."[10]

This political system generally known as the "Holy

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[1] *Benton's Abridgement*, VI., 139, 142.

[2] W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine.*

[3] *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, II., 553–586.

[4] *Ibid*, III., 193, 194.

[5] *Ibid*, III., 460, 468.

[6] *Ibid*, III., 460, 468.

[7] Bancroft, *History of the U. S.*, VI., 54, 55, 472, 474.

[8] *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, II., 386.

[9] "The First principle to be followed by the monarchs . . . should be that of maintaining the stability of political institutions against the disorganized excitement which has taken possession of men's minds." *Ibid*, II., 473.

[10] *Ibid*, III., 458, 459, 465, 472.

Alliance," originated in the Treaty of Chaumont, March 1, 1814,[1] and the Treaty of Vienna of March 25, 1815.[2]

On September 26, 1815, at Paris, Francis of Austria, Frederick William of Prussia, and Alexander I., of Russia, executed the documents, creating the so-called Holy Alliance.[3] On October 6, 1815, the Prince Regent of Great Britain, by letter, while stating that the "forms of the British Constitution" precluded "acceding formally" to the treaty, expressed his "entire concurrence in its principles."[4] The treaty was "acceded" to by France on November 11, 1815, the action however being apparently disregarded.

The subscribers solemnly declared "their fixed resolution" to "take for their sole guide [in their political relations] the precepts of justice, Christian charity and peace." They agreed "on all occasions and in all places, [to] lend each other aid and assistance." They further agreed that "the sole principle . . . shall be that of doing each other reciprocal service . . . for [they] look upon themselves as merely delegated by Providence to govern . . . branches of the one family."[5]

On November 20, 1815, a treaty which included the real co-ordinating force of the Alliance, was signed by Great Britain, Prussia, Russia and Austria.[6] This treaty, embodying the so-called Holy Alliance created the Quadruple Alliance. By the terms of this treaty the four powers agreed to combined action in the restoration of France, and in the general conduct of European affairs. In 1818 France was taken into the combination. This treaty among other things, provided for conferences of the signatory powers at fixed periods, which in effect placed the real governing power of Europe in the five sovereigns.

The first of these conferences was held at Aix-la-Chappelle in October 1818, and a declaration relative thereto was made by the Powers on November 15, 1818, which stated in part that:

> "This union . . . does not tend . . . to any change in the relations sanctioned by existing treaties . . . it has no other object than the maintenance of peace, and the guaranty of those transactions on which the peace was founded and consolidated . . . Faithful to these principles [the right of nations] the Sovereigns will maintain them equally in . . . meetings; whether they be for the purpose of discussing in common their own interests or whether they

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[1] *British and Foreign State Papers*, I., 121, 129.
[2] *Ibid*, II., 443.
[3] *British and Foreign State Papers*, III., 211-212.
[4] *Ibid*, III., 213.
[5] *British and Foreign St. Papers*, III., 211-212.
[6] *British and Foreign St. Papers*, III., 273–280.

shall relate to questions in which other governments shall formally claim that interference . . . "[1]

It had been generally understood that Spain's colonies in Spanish-America were to be at least one topic of discussion at this conference.[2] But for some reason they were not formally taken up at that time.

The revolutions in Naples, in Portugal and in Spain in 1820 resulted in another conference of the Quadruple Alliance at Troppau in November of that year, after which conference a circular relative to its results was drafted by the "Allied Courts" on December 8, 1820. This circular among other things declared that:

> "The events which took place March 8, in Spain, [decree of amnesty for political prisoners] July 2 at Naples [ratification of a constitutional government] and the Portuguese castrophy [convocation of Cortes by Lisbon and Oporto juntas to revise the constitution] have necessarily given rise to a deep feeling of uneasiness and chagrin . . . but at the same time has made them [the Allied Monarchs] recognize the need of reuniting and deliberating in common upon the methods of preventing all the evils which menace the foundations of Europe.
>
> "It was natural that these sentiments should make an especially keen impression upon the powers that had recently put down revolution and that had seen it again raise its head. It was not less natural that these powers, to combat it for the third time, should have recourse to the same methods of which they had made use with such success in that memorable struggle which delivered Europe from a yoke it had borne for twenty years.
>
> "Everything gave ground for hoping that this alliance . . . would also be in a position to put a check on a force not less tyrannical and less detestable, that of revolt and of crime. . . .
>
> "The powers have exercised an incontestable right in commonly concerting measures of safety against the States in which an overturn of the government effected by revolt can only be considered as a dangerous example, which must have for a result an attitude hostile against all constitutions and legitimate governments. The exercise of this right of necessity became still more urgent when those in that situation sought to communicate to neighboring states the evil in which they themselves were plunged and to propagate revolt and confusion among them. . . .

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[1] Parl. Pap. 1819, XVIII, 351.

[2] "*Letters and Dispatches of Castlereagh,*" XII, 66, A. G. Stapleton "*Pol. Life of George Canning,*" II., 10.

"We are convinced of the necessity of proceeding against the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, in accordance with the principles declared above. . . .

"The allied monarchs being resolved not to recognize a government produced by open revolt. . . "[1]

Though a representative of Great Britain attended this Troppau conference, he took no active part therein, and on January 21, 1819 Great Britain, in a communication to its ministers abroad, expressed its dissent from the principles set forth in such circular, and declined to become a party thereto, maintaining the Alliance, however, as to all other subjects.[2]

The Troppau Conference was adjourned to Laibäch to confer with the King of the Two Sicilies, and at its conclusion another declaration was made on May 12, 1821, in which it was stated that the Alliance was

"solely intended to combat and to repress rebellion," and that

"The allied troops . . . [had] been stationed at suitable places [in Italy] with the sole view to protecting the free exercise of legitimate authority. . . .

"In the future as in the past, they [the Allied Monarchs] will always have the purpose of preserving the independence and the rights of each state, as they are recognized and defined by existing treaties. The result . . . will still be . . . the consolidation of an order of things which will assure to the nations their repose and their prosperity.

"Penetrated by these sentiments, the allied Sovereigns . . . announce to the world the principles which have guided them. They are determined never to recede from them, and all . . . will see and . . . find in this union an assured guaranty against the attempts of disturbers."[3]

At the last conference of the Quadruple Alliance held at Verona in November and December, 1822, King Ferdinand VII of Spain requested the aid of the Alliance in dealing with Spain's American colonies. Spain's situation and her relation to her American colonies were there discussed. A plan was made for a conference in 1823 to which the United States was to be invited. On December 14, 1822, after the Verona conference, Austria, Prussia and Russia issued a circular relative thereto, in which appeared the following sentiment:

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[1] *British and Foreign St. Pap.*, VIII., 1149–1151, (Translation): *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, III., 444-447.

[2] *British and Foreign St. Pap.*, VIII, 1160.

[3] *British and For. St. Pap.*, VIII., 1201.

"The Monarchs [are] determined on replusing the principle of revolt in whatever place or under whatever form it might show itself. . . . "[1]

It is a generally accepted fact, though never officially acknowledged, that at this Verona conference a secret treaty was executed by Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, which, whether true or untrue, indicates the real motives and intentions of the Alliance. The first article of this alleged secret treaty was as follows:

"Article 1. The high contracting parties being convinced that the system of representative government is equally incompatible with the monarchial principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, and in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known."[2]

On November 22, 1822, Great Britain following a long-established policy in dealing with a possible French and Spanish accord, declared its refusal to participate in the French invasion of Spain[3] which the Quadruple Alliance authorized. In this Great Britain was undoubtedly also influenced by Russia's growing intimacy with Spain and France as well as by Russia's growing rivalry in maritime and colonial interests.[4]

In apparent pursuance of the plan for a conference on Spain's colonies, and proving that such intervention was intended, Spain's Minister of State wrote the Alliance some twenty-four days after Monroe's message to Congress of December 2, 1823, in part as follows:

"The King . . . has seriously turned His thoughts to the fate of His American dominions . . . Accordingly the King has resolved upon inviting the Cabinets of His dear and intimate Allies to establish a Conference at Paris, to the end that their Plenipotentiaries . . . may aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of the revolted Countries of America. . . . His Majesty, confiding in the sentiments of His Allies hopes that they will assist Him in accomplishing the worthy object of upholding the principles of order

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[1] *Br. and For. St. Papers*, X., 921–925; *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, III., 655-662.

[2] Niles *Register*, Aug. 2, 1823, XXIV, 347; Eliot, *Am. Diplomatic Code*, II., 179.

[3] *Br. and For. St. Papers*, X 4, 5, 11, 17.

[4] C. K. Webster, *Some Aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign Policy, Transactions of Royal Hist. Soc., 3d Series, vol. VI.*

and legitimacy the subversion of which, once commenced in America, would presently communicate to Europe. . . "[1]

Invitations to attend such a conference to be held at Paris had been sent to Austria, France and Russia, a copy being handed to the British Ambassador to Spain.[2] Monroe's message reached Europe, however, before Canning made any announcement of Great Britain's position as to such a conference.

Such were the principles and aims of the Quadruple Alliance. Metternich, Prime Minister of Austria, whose genius was the guiding spirit of Europe at this time, believed that Europe's only salvation lay in the maintenance of the principle of "Legitimacy," the divine right of kings to rule their people, and the corresponding "divine duty" of the people to submit. In Europe the French Revolution, brought about or hastened by the American Revolution, had set up the Convention, the representative of the people. Metternich, therefore, advocated the prohibition of such popular forms of government, and, as a preventive therefor, urged the suppression of rebellions everywhere. Metternich was ably supported in his plans by Castlereagh the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.[3]

In its determination to destroy popular government the Alliance exerted its tremendous power successfully in crushing revolutions in Piedmont and in Naples in 1821, and in Spain in 1823.[4] But for the objection of Great Britain, a similar revolution in Portugal, which had broken out in August 1820 would also have been crushed.

As indicating what the position of the Alliance would be if Spain under a "Legitimate" government, should attempt to regain her colonies, Metternich's letter of March 20, 1823, to Esterhazy, relative to Great Britain's suggestion of preventing the war between France and Spain which France's invasion of Spain would undoubtedly bring about, is most enlightening. Metternich said,

"The idea of neutrality in this struggle is incompatible with our political system. The Emperor [of Austria] could not declare himself neutral if a principle were in question on which the existence of his Empire . . . depended, a

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[1] *Br. and For. St. Papers*, XI., 55–57.
A. G. Stapleton, *Political Life of George Canning*, II., 34.

[2] Stapleton's *Pol. Life of George Canning*, II., 33, 42.

[3] C. K. Webster, *Some Aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign Policy—Transactions of Royal Hist. Soc. 3d series, Vol. VI.*

[4] *Br. and For. St. Pap.*, VIII., 1149, 1151, 1201. *Br. and For. St. Pap.* X., 921–925. See generally, *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*," III., 385–651.
A. G. Stapleton, *Pol. Life of Geo. Canning*, I., 133.

principle which we have never ceased to regard as the fundamental basis of the Alliance."[1]

It was generally believed that the next movement of the Quadruple Alliance, as indicated by the Conference of Verona, would be a concerted action to suppress the revolutions in the various Spanish colonies in America. Ultimately, it was feared, definite action would be taken against the United States,[2]

This, then, was the situation with reference to Spanish America which confronted the United States in 1823, during Monroe's administration.

The second danger which confronted the United States at this time lay in Russia's attitude toward Oregon, which involved the title to a vast stretch of territory.

The Russian-American Company, organized in Russia, was granted a charter by the Czar in 1799 which carried with it jurisdiction over the North Pacific Coast of North America to the 55th parallel of north latitude and also the right to found posts even farther south in territory not then occupied by other nations.[3] In 1792, Captain Gray, a citizen of the United States, had discovered the Columbia River, and in 1806 the Lewis and Clark expedition, inaugurated by President Jefferson, explored the Columbia, and found no Russians, or other civilized peoples in that locality. It was not until about 1813 that Russians began to establish posts farther south than the 55th parallel. By right of discovery and exploration, therefore, the United States acquired title to the territory, then known as Oregon.

Great Britain and Spain also asserted claims to this same territory. But after the war of 1812 Great Britain and the United States entered into an agreement providing for a temporary joint occupation of the disputed territory. Spain by the treaty of 1819, in ceding Florida to the United States, also ceded all her rights in the Oregon territory, north of the 42nd parallel of latitude, leaving the three remaining claimants all asserting title to the Pacific Coast north of California, which included the Columbia River and the access it gave to the great territory it drained.

On September 7, 1821, Alexander I. of Russia, issued the following ukase:

> "The pursuits of commerce, whaling, and fishering, and of all other industry, in all islands, ports, and gulfs, including the whole of the northwest coast of America, beginning from Behring's Straits, to the 51 of northern latitude . . . , is exclusively granted to Russian subjects.

[1] *Memoirs of Prince Metternich*, IV., 37.

[2] A. G. Stapleton, *Pol. Life of George Canning*, II., 20, 21.

[3] J. B. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, I., 890.

It is therefore prohibited to all foreign vessels, not only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia, as stated above, but also to approach them within less than a hundred Italian miles. The transgressor's vessel is subject to confiscation, along with the whole cargo."[1]

In this ukase Russia not only extended her territorial claim four degrees farther south than she had previously claimed, and beyond the 54° 40′ parallel claimed by the United States as its proper boundary, but also asserted an exclusive right to the North Pacific Ocean and to the Behring Sea, which claims were not finally settled until 1824.[2]

This naturally brought about more or less strained relations between Russia and the United States, which were aggravated by reason of an announcement made on October 16, 1823, to John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State, by Baron Von Tuyll, Russia's Minister to the United States, which interjected the Holy Alliance and Spanish America into the controversy: This announcement related to the question of Russia's recognition of the Spanish-American nations, and was to the effect that,

"Faithful to the political principles which she [Russia] observed in concert with her Allies, she could in no wise receive any agent . . . of the *de facto* governments which owe their existence to the events of which the New World has for some years been the theatre."[3]

When directly pressed by Adams as to what was meant by the phrase, "political principles," Von Tuyll stated that,

"He understood them as having reference to the right of supremacy of Spain over her colonies."[4]

This, in effect, was a declaration that Russia, already at issue with the United States upon the Oregon boundary, had definitely alligned herself with the other members of the Holy Alliance against the Spanish-American nations, whose independence had already been recognized by the United States. Russia had so little regard for this country and its power as openly to criticise its republican form of government, and the events which made it possible and which brought it about, because the criticism which was made of the Spanish-American nations applied equally to the United States.

Mr. Adams referring to a discussion on July 17, 1823, with Von Tuyll upon the Oregon matter, said,

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[1]J. B. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, I., 891.
[2]J. B. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, I., 891.
[3]J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 180–182.
[4]J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 182.

"I told him specially that we should contest the right of Russia to *any* territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for *any* new European colonial establishments."[1]

On July 22, 1823, Adams sent a dispatch to Middleton, our Minister to Russia, in which he emphasized this same principle in the following words:

"There can perhaps be no better time for saying frankly and explicitly, to the Russian Government, that the future peace of the world, and the interest of Russia herself, cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American Continent. With the exception of the British establishments north of the United States, the remainder of both the American continents must henceforth be left to the management of American hands."[2]

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[1] J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 163.
[2] J. B. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, I., 462, 463.
J. B. Moore, *Int. Arbitrations*, I., 760.

CHAPTER V.—GREAT BRITAIN AND HER DESIRE FOR A JOINT DECLARATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

Great Britain's ministry, while sympathizing with the anti-republican principles of the Holy Alliance nevertheless feared French political ascendency in Europe and commerical ascendency in the Spanish-American Colonies, and sought a joint declaration with the United States opposing intervention by France and the Holy Alliance in the affairs of the rebellious Spanish-American Colonies.

While the question of recognition of the South American republics was being strenuously advocated by Henry Clay, President Monroe, on May 13, 1818, suggested to John Quincy Adams that Great Britain be sounded upon the proposition of such recognition,[1] and in 1819 such a step was taken, the diplomatic suggestion then being made that Great Britain recognize Buenos Ayres, and do so simultaneously with the United States.

During the month of July, 1818, Castlereagh, then the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, informed Richard Rush, our Minister at London, that Great Britain and the other members of the Alliance had been requested by Spain to mediate between Spain and her rebellious American colonies. To this Mr. Rush replied that the United States would not intervene to establish any peace unless the basis thereof was to be the independence of those colonies.[2]

George Canning succeeded Castlereagh, as Foreign Secretary, upon the death of the latter, in 1822. At that time, the British Ministry was "legitimist" in its sympathies, and at one time, constituted "the center of the opposition to revolutionary tendencies in Europe."[3]

George Canning was also an advocate of "legitimacy"[4] which inclined him to the side of the Holy Alliance, and to the side of Spain in her efforts to regain her American colonies. But British trade with these same colonies had developed greatly from the time of their breaking away from Spain. With the possible exception of the slave trade monopoly, granted to England in 1713, and a few other concessions,[5] Spain's general policy of colonial administration had been to confine

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[1] J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV., 91–92.

[2] Von Holst's, *Constitutional Hist. of U. S.*, I., 419.

R. Rush, *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, pp. 330, 331.*

[3] F. L. Paxson, *Independence of So. Am. Reps.* 2nd ed., p. 251.

[4] R. Rush, *The Court at London, 1819–1825*, pp. 467, 468;

A. G. Stapleton, *George Canning and His Times*, 380; J. S. Ewart, *Canning Policy* in *Kingdom Papers*, XVI., 173.

[5] J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin Am.*, pp. 12, 13.

that commerce to Spain and to Spanish ships.[1] So burdensome were these restrictions to the colonists that a great smuggling trade in and out of the colonies had sprung up.[2] Because of these restrictions, and in an effort to open up this colonial trade to the British, there had been considerable agitation in England, as early as 1779, to bring about revolutions in these colonies, and to separate them from Spain.[3] The revolt, when it came "opened the door to British trade at a time when Napoleon was doing his best to close all other doors to it."[4]

If then, Spain were to regain her colonies, her administration of them, as evidenced by her past, would greatly curtail British trade. Again, if, by reason of France's invasion of Spain (which was almost equivalent to a declaration of war against Great Britain),[5] and of her contemplated assistance of Spain in the latter's effort to regain her colonies, France were to secure a portion of these colonies as compensation, and she apparently desired to do so,[6] the British merchants believed that Great Britain stood very little chance of holding that trade.

The British "newly won commercial supremacy must be maintained and developed. Thus far public opinion was supreme."[7] Canning was, therefore, subjected to a tremendous pressure by the British merchant class[8] to prevent France from so intervening. In fact, as early as 1798, it had been determined that in the event of the colonies passing into the control of France, Great Britain would bring about their complete independence.[9] As between the principles of "legitimacy" and the interests of trade, Canning determined to

[1] J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin Am.* pp. 6, 12: Hall's *Journal*, I., pp. 249, 296.

[2] Hall's *Journal*, I., 253, 254.

[3] J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin Am.*, pp. 14, 15.
A. Mahan, *The Monroe Doctrine*, National Rev. (1903), XL., 8 1.
Letters and Despatches of Castlereagh, VII., 266.

[4] E. M. Lloyd, *Canning and Span. Am.*, Trans. of Royal Hist. Soc. (N.S.), XVIII, 82:
F. L. Paxson, *Independence of So. Am. Reps.*, 2d ed., pp. 251–252.

[5] *Annual Register* (London), 1823, p. 25.

[6] E. Everett, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 4; A. G. Stapleton, *Pol. Life of Canning*, II, 32–33.

[7] W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 12, 13.

[8] *Ibid*, 24.

[9] "But, if as appears probably, the army destined against Portugal, and which will march through Spain, or any other means which may be employed by France, shall overthrow the Spanish Government, and thereby place the resources of Spain and of her colonies at the disposal of France, England will immediately commence the execution of a plan long since digested and prepared for the complete independence of South America." *Life and Correspondence of R. King*, II., 650).
". . . and I should have no difficulty in deciding that we ought to prevent, by every means in our power, perhaps Spain from sending a single Spanish regiment to South America, after the supposed termination of the war in Spain, but certainly France from affording to Spain any aid or assistance for that purpose." (Memo of Canning 1823—*Life of Lord Liverpool*, III, 231: *Official correspondence of Canning*, I, 85.)

pursue the latter.[1] His policy therein "was essentially British" in its character and purpose.[2]

Canning accordingly directed his efforts toward preventing the intervention of France, first by attempting to secure a joint declaration by the United States and Great Britain, opposing such intervention, which proved unsuccessful, and later by endeavoring to secure a disclaimer of such intention from France, which endeavor was successful. The effort to secure this "joint declaration," constituted one of the several circumstances leading up to Monroe's message of December 2, 1823.

On August 16, 1823, Canning verbally discussed with Mr. Rush the question of a joint declaration by their governments, which would have the desired effect of forestalling any intervention by France in Spanish-American affairs. To these overtures Mr. Rush replied that he would take the matter up with the United States Government countering however, by asking Canning's position upon the question of recognition, to which Canning answered that no steps toward that end had been taken.[3]

On August 20, 1823, Canning wrote to Rush definitely suggesting such a joint declaration upon the part of the two governments, stating among other things,

"1. We [Great Britain] conceive the recovery of the Colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them as Independent States, to be one of time and circumstances.

3. We are, however, by no means dispposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country by amicable negotiations.

4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.

5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference."[4]

As a matter of fact, the substance of this note, according to a later statement of Canning himself, had been previously communicated in another note to France, and thereafter to

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[1]F. L. Paxson, *Indep. of So. Am. Rep.*, 2 ed., pp. 251-252.

T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 7.

Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823. Rush Corresp., etc., *Mass. Hist. Soc., 2d. Series*, XV., 434–436.

[2]T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 13.

[3]R. Rush, *The Court of London, etc.*, pp. 361–366.

Rush Correspondence etc., *Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd. Series*, XV., 412–415.

R. Rush, *The Court of London, etc.*, pp. 376–378.

R. Rush Correspondence etc., *Mass. Hist. Soc., 2nd Series*, XV., 415, 416.

Austria, Russia, Prussia, Portugal and the Netherlands, Canning desiring to prevent such intervention and taking every step which he thought might accomplish that purpose. This note to Rush, therefore, did not, as some people believe, constitute an exclusive invitation to the United States.[2]

It is to be noted that in the second clause quoted, Canning totally ignored the fact that the United States had already recognized the South American republics, and also, that in the fifth clause he apparently intended to have the United States commit themselves for all time to a non-intervention and non-annexation policy for South America and Central America.

On August 23, 1823, Canning again wrote Mr. Rush, and to the effect that the Holy Alliance was soon to take up for discussion the question of Spain and her colonies, and he urged the making of a joint declaration.[3] To this Mr. Rush suggested immediate recognition by Great Britain, apparently being ready, upon that basis, to assume responsibility for a joint declaration.[4]

On August 31, 1823, Canning wrote Mr. Rush to the effect that Great Britain was not prepared to accord such an immediate recognition.[5] On September 18, and again on September 26, 1823, Canning conferred with Rush. On the latter date he asked if Rush would not assent to a joint declaration on Great Britain's *promise* of *future* recognition, which proposal Rush immediately and unequivocally rejected.[6]

The refusal of Great Britain to recognize the independence of the Spanish colonies at that time created an impassse between Rush and Canning. After September 26, 1823, though he saw Rush on October 8 and 9, 1823, Canning scarcely referred to Spanish-America at all, and did not again allude to the matter of a joint declaration. So striking was this abrupt and sudden cooling that Rush considered the entire discussion ended, notifying our State Department to that effect. He suspected however, that some fresh understanding between Great Britain and France might explain it.[7] As to this matter, Stapleton, Canning's biographer, stated that,

> "Mr. Canning thought that, next to the acquirement of a coadjutor so powerful as the United States, the best thing would be to acquaint the French Government, by a direct communication, that it could not prosecute its designs

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[1] *Br. and For. St. Pap.*, XI., 61, 62.

[2] World Peace Foundation, *A League of Nations*, June 1918, p. 285.

[3] Rush Correspondence etc., *Mass. Hist. Soc., 2nd Series*, XV., 416, 417: Rush, *The Court of London, etc.*, 382.

[4] Rush, *The Court of London, etc.*, pp. 382–384.

[5] Rush, *The Court of London, etc.*, pp. 384–388: Rush corresp. etc., *Mass. Hist. Soc., 2nd Series*, XV., 418, 419.

[6] Rush, *The Court of London*, etc., 384–406, Rush corresp. etc., *Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd Series*,, XV., 422, 424.

[7] *Ibid*, XV., 424–428, 431–433.

in Spanish America, except at the expense of a war with this country."[1]

As a matter of fact, after the conference of September 26, Canning, according to his own statement, sought an "explanation" with France. He conferred with Prince dePolignac, the French Ambassador at London, on October 9, 1823, and secured from him a statement to the effect that France believed it hopeless to reduce Spanish-America to its former state, and that France disclaimed any intention or desire to appropriate any part of the Spanish possessions in America, or to obtain any exclusive advantages therein.[2] This was not communicated to Rush, however, until late in November and consequently did not in any way affect Monroe's message.[3]

According to Rush, "The apprehension of Britain [seemed] to be fully allayed, at least for the present . . . on the score of French aggrandisement in Spanish America."[4] Canning having accomplished his purpose by this "Explanation" of France, without definitely aligning herself against the Holy Alliance, and desiring not to offend the Holy Alliance, was apparently no longer interested in a joint declaration.[5] This adequately explains Canning's "cooling" process.

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[1]A. G. Stapleton, *Political Life of George Canning*, II, 26.

[2]A. G. Stapleton, *Pol. Life of George Canning*, II., 26–30: *Br. and For. St. Pap.*, XI., 49–53: Rush corres. in *Mass. Hist. Soc.* 2d Series, XV., 430–436.

[3]Rush, *The Court at London, etc.*, pp. 409–415: W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 54.

[4]Rush corres. in *Mass. Hist. Soc., 2d Series*, XV., 430–433.

[5]"Our intercourse in August, not having led to any practical results nor become matter of discussion between our respective governments will be considered as having passed between two individuals relying upon each other's honour and discretion." (Canning to Rush, Dec., 13, 1823, Rush Corres. in *Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d. series*, XV,. 433, 434.)

"All serious danger to Spanish America being now at an end, I do not at present see what there is to prevent a return to that effective amity between Great Britain and that alliance [Holy Alliance] which has heretofore existed. Events the most recent and authoritative justify us in saying, that no attempt upon the liberties of Europe, will essentially throw Britain off from the connection, or impair her co-equal allegiance to the Monarchial principle." (Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823. Rush Corresp. in *Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d Series*, XV., 434, 436.)

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CHAPTER VI—ITS REFUSAL

The United States Refused to Enter into Any Such Joint Declaration with Great Britain.

The situations considered in the last three chapters had been slowly but gradually developing, both before and during the Presidency of James Monroe. At the same time an intense spirit of nationalism, guided and nourished by Henry Clay and to a great extent by Chief Justice John Marshall, was also developing in the United States.[1] Prior to and even during the War of 1812 a considerable part of the population, particularly in New England, was opposed to any interference with Great Britain's conduct of the war against France.[2] They were willing to suffer quietly and submissively all the injuries inflicted upon the United States by Great Britain,[3] and even considered seriously the dissolution of the Union.[4] Open rebellion was imminent.[5] "Since the adoption of the Constitution, nearly all Americans except the younger generation, had become re-Europeanized in thought and feeling."[6] Of that younger generation it was Henry Clay, from Kentucky, the great exponent of Americanism, who stirred the country to action in 1812.

The War of 1812, however, "achieved an inestimable good—it de-Europeanized America. It put an end to our thinking and feeling in European terms and emotions. It developed the spirit of the new America—now for the first time emancipated from the intellectual and spiritual sovereignty of the Old World."[7]

Monroe had been Minister to France under Washington's administration in 1794,[8] during the period when Washington, in his attempt to safeguard the country, was deliberately applying the principle of his purely American foreign policy of keeping out of all wars between the European nations. Monroe was undoubtedly familiar with this principle before he went

[1]A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 1–58: Scott *v.* Peters, 5 *Cranch* (U. S. Rept.), p. 135.

[2]Morris, *Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris*, II., 548: A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 5.

[3]John Lowell, *Peace with Dishonor—War without Hope* (by a "Yankee Farmer"), pp. 39, 40.

[4]H. Adams, *History of U. S.*, V. 36.

[5]A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 1–58.

[6]A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 4.

[7]A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 56.

[8]D. C. Gilman, *James Monroe*, p. 40.

to France,[1] and while in France, was forcefully reminded of it by Randolph, then Secretary of State.[2]

He and Livingston were sent to France by President Jefferson in 1802, as special envoys to negotiate the purchase of Louisiana,[3] in which transaction the interests of Spain, of France and of England, as well as those of the United States were involved. In these negotiations he and Livingston were eminently successful. In 1803, he was special envoy to England for the purpose of asserting our national claims relative to impressment, blockade, and search,[4] and again went to England, with Pinkney in 1806 and 1807. In 1804 he was in Spain as special envoy to secure the cession of Florida, an effort which proved unsuccessful.[5]

President Madison named Monroe as his Secretary of State in 1811. He therefore held that great office at the time when England's persistent violation of our rights as a neutral, her insistence on her right of impressment, and her determined hostility to the United States brought on the War of 1812.[6] He was a party to the regeneration of that great spirit of nationalism which animated that period, and undoubtedly he was familiar with Madison's message of January 3, 1811, and the action of Congress thereon, making clear the attitude of the United States as to Spain's transfer of Florida to any other foreign power.

Monroe was also familiar with the warnings of Washington, of Adams, of Jefferson and of Madison as to the absolute necessity of the United States abstaining from participation in European politics. This thoroughly American foreign policy, actually applied during Washington's administration, was essentially the policy which guided all administrations from that of Washington down to the time of Monroe's presidency. If not a tradition, this policy had very nearly approached it at the time when Monroe was confronted with the two situations already referred to, the one involving the Holy Alliance, its direct threat to the Spanish-American nations, and its indirect threat to the United States; the other involving Russia and the Oregon boundary.

Monroe's Secretary of State was John Quincy Adams, probably the most distinguished American in active public life at that time. He had, as a boy, accompanied his father when the latter went to France as envoy. When fourteen, he had gone to St. Petersburg as private secretary to Francis Dana.[7] Later he acted successively as Minister to Holland,

[1] D. C. Gilman, *James Monroe*, pp. 41, 48.
[2] *Ibid*, pp. 57, 58.
[3] *Ibid*, pp. 79–95.
[4] *Ibid*, pp. 96, 97, 105.
[5] *Ibid*, pp. 98, 99.
[6] *Ibid*, 107–127: A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 6–58.
[7] J. T. Morse, Jr., *John Quincy Adams*, p. 13.

to Portugal, to Prussia, to Russia and to England.[1] He participated actively in the diplomatic matters resulting from both the Revolution and the War of 1812. He was undoubtedly the best equipped man in the country to handle the problems then confronting the State Department.[2]

Monroe and Adams were, therefore, well versed in European affairs, European designs, and European methods of political thought.

During most of Monroe's Presidency, Richard Rush was the American Minister in London. His official dealings with the British government were with Castlereagh, the Foreign Secretary, and on his death with George Canning.

The situation presented to Monroe in 1823 resembled in many ways the situation which confronted Washington in 1793 at the time of the French-English War. On both occasions the United States was in grave danger, which consisted to a great degree in the difficulties of European nations and the probability of involving the United States in these difficulties. A mistake might mean the total destruction of the nation. In 1793 the danger lay in the United States taking positive action in European affairs. The only solution of the problem was carefully to avoid becoming involved, and then, it was a question of volition upon the part of the United States. At that time, the Neutrality Proclamation, an exercise of volition and discretion, saved the country. In 1823 one aspect of the problem was to avoid becoming involved in the designs of France of Spain, of Great Britain, and of the Holy Alliance. The threatened danger, at this time, however, lay in Europe's taking positive action in American affairs. While in 1823 any action to be taken by the United States might be regarded as voluntary, yet, as a matter of fact, if Europe actively intervened in the Americas, the United States without any exercise of volition would necessarily be obliged to fight for its own protection.

The settlement of the crisis of 1793 pointed the way to safety[3] and the same principle of self-protection, which dictated Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, and his statement as to British intervention in American affairs, dictated the program. In 1793 self-protection required the United States to keep out of European affairs. In 1823 on the other hand, it demanded that Europe keep out of American affairs. The latter was the complement of the former and would undoubtedly have been the definite policy of this country even if Monroe's message had never been written.[4]

On November 7, 1823, President Monroe's cabinet began discussing the proposition of such a joint declaration upon the

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[1] J. T. Morse, p. *John Quincy Adams*, pp. 19, 23, 24, 70, 75, 76.

[2] Rept. of Sec'y Fish to Pres. Grant, July 14, 1870, *Senate Ex. Doc.*, 112– 41st. cong., 2d. session 1, 3.

[3] J. B. Moore, *Principles of American Diplomacy*, p. 198.

[4] *Ibid*, pp. 258, 259.

part of the United States and Great Britain. Monroe[1] and Calhoun favored it. Jefferson[2], in spite of his life-long prejudice against Great Britain favored it, because he believed it to be a good diplomatic manoeuvre under the existing circumstances[3]. Madison also approved it.[4] Secretary of State Adams, however, stoutly opposed such a step and urged a separate and distinct American declaration. He was the only one of the Cabinet who saw and pointed out the significant part of Canning's suggestion, stating that,

> "The object of Canning appears to have been to obtain some public pledge from the Government of the United States, ostensibly against the forcible interference of the Holy Alliance between Spain and South America; but really or especially against the acquisition to the United States themselves of any part of the Spanish-American possessions, . . . by joining with her, therefore, we give her a substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge against ourselves."[5]

Adams also pointed out the striking and sinister inconsistency between Great Britain's anxious request for a joint protest against intervention by other European Powers, in

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[1]"My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British Gov't., to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us. I am sensible however, of the extent & difficulty of the question, & shall be happy to have yours & Mr. Madison's opinions on it." (Monroe's letter of Oct. 17, 1823 to Jefferson, Hamilton's *Writings of James Monroe*, VI., 323–325. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 393.

[2]"The question presented by the letters you have sent me, is the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. That made us a nation, this sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. And never could we embark on it under circumstances more auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. . . .

"But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is nor her [Great Britain] war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should do it . . . " (Jefferson's reply to above, Oct. 24, 1823, Ford's *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, X., 277, 278-315: Wharton, *Dig. of Int. Law*, I., 268–270.

[3]A. J. Beveridge *Life of John Marshall*, IV., 8, and notes.

[4]Madison went further than Jefferson and recommended that the declaration disapprove of the invasion of Spain and of any interference with Greece. (Hamilton's, *Writings of James Madison*, IX., 161, 162: *Madison's Works*, III., 339: Wharton, *Dig. of Int. Law.*, I., 270–271.

[5]J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 177, 178.

Spanish-America, and her stubborn refusal to recognize the independence of the Spanish-American republics. He argued that, "The United States, having acknowledged the independence of the Trans-Atlantic territories, had a right to object to the interference of foreign powers in the affairs of these territories," and that, "The South Americans as independent nations . . . themselves, and no other nation, had the right to dispose of their condition."[1]

Adams, remindful of the traditional American foreign policy, urged a declaration by the United States only, which would contain, "an earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America: to make an American cause and adhere inflexibly to that."[2] He contended that the Russian communications should be made use of as an opportunity, and as a basis for such a declaration,[3] which declaration, while answering Von Tuyll and Russia, would also, and at the same time, answer Canning, Great Britain and the Holy Alliance. His arguments to the Cabinet carried the day.

It appears that the phraseology of Monroe's message, particularly the two sections generally accepted as including the gist of the message, was to some degree at least the work of Adams. Plumer, a New Hampshire Congressman during that period, stated that the part of the message dealing with foreign affairs, bore "the direct impress of Mr. Adams' genius."[4]

W. F. Reddaway, the British writer upon the Doctrine, states that "The occasion and the principles of the Monroe Doctrine . . . point to the authorship of Adams."[5] Elihu Root says that Adams "played a major part in forming the policy."[6] Many other writers,[7] including Worthington Ford attribute to Adams the formulation of the ideas set forth in the Doctrine.[8]

Jefferson, as is seen by his letter of October 24, 1823, to Monroe, also had much to do with the actual message. He was the first to set forth in so many words the broad principle that Europe should be kept out of American affairs. He therein stated that

> "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second,

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[1]J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, 186.

[2]W. C. Ford, *Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*, in *Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd Series*, XV, 392.

[3]J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 178, 179.

[4]*Pennsylvania Mag. of Hist. and Biog.*, VI., No. 3, p. 358.

[5]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 80.

[6]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 114.

[7]A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 64: H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II., 145: W. Ford *Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine* in *Mass. Hist. Soc.* 2 Series, XV.

[8]For criticism of such position see James Schouler, *Authorship of Monroe Doctrine*, in *Annual Report Am. Hist. Assoc.* 1905, I., 126.

never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs."[1]

As a matter of fact, it might well be said that neither Adams, nor Monroe was the "author,"[2] and that the phrase "Monroe Doctrine," has merely "become a convenient title by which is denoted a principle that doubtless would have been wrought out if the message of 1823 had never been written—the principle of the limitation of European power and influence in the Western Hemisphere."[3]

Whatever may be the merits of this discussion as to the formulation of the ideas or principles, it remains true that it was the declaration of these principles by the President of the United States that gave them international standing.[4] The responsibility for this enunciation lay with President Monroe. His, therefore, must be the credit for its, "courageous pronouncement before Congress and all Europe, upon his own solemn responsibility as Chief Magistrate."[5]

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[1]Ford's *Writings of Jefferson*, X., 277, 278.

[2]T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 92, 93,

[3]J. B. Moore, *Principles of Am. Diplomacy*, pp. 258, 259: W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, p. 329.

[4]Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823,—Rush Corres. in *Mass. Hist. Soc. 2nd Series*, XV., 434, 436.

[5]James Schouler, *Auth. of Monroe Doctrine*, p. 127.

CHAPTER VII.—THE MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

The United States, through President Monroe, proclaimed to the world the determination to prevent any European nation from future colonization in, or extension of its political system to the Western Hemisphere.

After considerable discussion by the Cabinet, President Monroe's message was finally drafted and submitted to Congress on December 2, 1823. The portions of the message which bear upon the principles involved, and which have caused those principles to be known as "The Monroe Doctrine," are the following:

> ". . . The occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered subjects for future colonization by any European Powers. . .
>
> ". . . In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with out policy so to do. . . With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained, it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. . . .
>
> ". . . Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remain the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; . . .
>
> ". . . . It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; . . . It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference . . . "[1]

[1] J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, II., 2089: *Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.*, V., 246, 250.

An analysis of these portions of the message produces the following brief propositions as the essence of the doctrine:

1. The policy of the United States with reference to Europe is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers, and not to take part in any of their wars which concern such powers only.
2. In both continents of the Western Hemisphere, the United States have an immediate interest. Neither continent can be considered as open to future colonization by any European power.
3. No European power may extend its political system beyond its present limits in either continent.
4. Any attempt of any European power or combination of such powers so to extend its or their political system, and particularly any interposition of any such power or powers which would in any way control the political destinies of the Spanish-American nations will be considered as so dangerous to the peace, safety and happiness of the United States that they would not behold the same with indifference, but would consider it as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition and act accordingly.

These propositions are essentially the same in principle as the foreign policy thought out by Washington[1] and applied by him in 1792[2] during his first administration, in his refusal to allow Great Britain to intervene between the United States and the Indians, and in his Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793.[3]

This traditional American foreign policy, and its two complementary principles of no intervention in European affairs and of no toleration of any intervention by any non-American nation in the affairs of the American nations, both based upon that natural right of the nation to protect itself, are clearly summed up, and openly and deliberately announced to the world in this message of President Monroe.

At the time when this message was published little if anything was thought politically of Asia, Africa, or Australia, and the United States was not then menaced from any of those quarters. While the message refers to European powers, the principles laid down apply in essence to all non-American nations, and to Japan as well as to France.

It is to be noted also that these complementary principles involved in the Monroe Doctrine do not comprise all the foreign policies of the United States. On the contrary, the Doctrine is strictly limited and is confined to the subjects which it purports to cover.[4]

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[1]Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895—*Senate Ex. Doc., 31–54th Cong. 1st. Sess.*, p. 4.

[2]H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II., 145.

[3]*Ibid*, II., 144, 145, 185.

[4]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, 117.

CHAPTER VIII—THE DOCTRINE TESTED

The Monroe Doctrine, has been tested at various times by France, Spain, Germany, Great Britian and Japan, but the United States has resolutely maintained this policy to the present time.

A—FRANCE

(a) As to Cuba.

When President Monroe's message was published in Europe, Chateaubriand, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that the principles therein enunciated,

> "Ought to be resisted by the Powers possessing either territorial, or commercial, interest in that Hemisphere."[1]

This undoubtedly reflected the attitude of official France, for that country, despoiled of the Napoleonic conquests by the Treaty of Vienna, desired colonies and looked with eager eyes at South and at Central America, as well as at Cuba, and the other islands of the West Indies. Hence she bitterly resented the recognition of the South American nations by the United States.

Prior to 1825 Great Britain had made one or more unsuccessful efforts to buy Cuba from Spain.[2] Apparently she contemplated seizing it in 1823.[3] In 1825 Great Britain feared that Cuba might be acquired by the United States, and Canning was bitterly opposed to any such measure.[4]

The menace of France to Great Britain from the western hemisphere was more or less taken care of by Canning in 1823, so that he had no fear in suggesting that Great Britain would rather see France secure Cuba than the United States.[5]

Subsequently, in 1825, France, then the second largest naval power in the world, sent a fleet to Cuba. At that time the rumor was widespread that Spain intended to transfer the island to France. Henry Clay, then Secretary of State, realizing the threatened infringement of the doctrine, and under the direction of President John Quincy Adams, promptly

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[1] Quoted by A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 84.

[2] "From various sources intimations have been received here that the British Government have it in contemplation to obtain possession of the island [Cuba] . . . they have been for more than two years in secret negotiation with Spain for the cession of the island," Adams to Forsyth, Dec. 17, 1822, *MS. Inst. U. S. Ministers*, IX., 158: See generally Niles' *Register*, Nov. 8, 1817, and *The Cession of the Floridas to the United States of America, and the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba by Great Britain*, (London, 1819.).

[3] *Corresp. of Canning*, I., 116, 117 (note).

[4] *Wellington's Despatches*, I., 511, 545.

[5] DeVillele, *Memoirs*, V., 160.

applied the principles underlying the Monroe Doctrine, and notified France that the United States could not under any circumstances whatever[1] permit any power other than Spain to possess Cuba, or Porto Rico. This has been frequently stated to be the first occasion when the principle was actually applied to the prohibition of the transfer of American colonies by one European power to another. However, such a transfer clearly would have been contrary to the intent of the Doctrine, and a violation of its fundamental principles. If France at that contemplated the annexation of Cuba, she did not press the matter any further.

(b) As to Mexico

In 1821 Mexico became independent and thereafter set up a republican form of government. During a revolution in 1851 President Comonfort was driven from the capital. Zuloaga was made President by the rebels and his government, established at Mexico City, was recognized as the *de facto* government of Mexico by the United States and by other powers. Meanwhile Juarez, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, purporting to act under the Mexican constitution, organized a rival government at Vera Cruz. Zuloaga later substituted Miramon for himself as President. Miramon published a decree in October 1859, providing for the issue of $15,000,000 of Mexican bonds, expecting to raise by such issue the sum of $750,000. Jecker, the Swiss promoter or underwriter of the issue failed, and the bonds got into the hands of his creditors. France in 1861 made a claim against Mexico for several millions of dollars, including torts against French subjects in Mexico and defaults on this Miramon bond issue,[2] the then government of Mexico having denied the validity of such issue.[3]

On October 31, 1861, while the United States was engaged by the Civil War, France, Great Britain and Spain, all alleging claims of similar nature against Mexico,[4] agreed to act jointly against her,[5] declaring their intention, however, not to interfere with Mexico's right to determine its own form of Government.[6] Their combined forces seized Vera Cruz in December

[1] *Am. State Pap. For. Rel.*, V., 855.

[2] Wharton's *Digest of Int. Law.*, I., 312, Sect. 58: J. B. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 483, 484.

[3] *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, LII., 294.

[4] *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, LII.: *House Ex. Doc. 100-37th, Cong., 2 Sess.*; J. B. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 483, 484.

[5] *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, LII., 398.

[6] "The high contracting parties bind themselves not to seek for themselves . . . any acquisition of territory . . . and not to exercise in the subsequent affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexcian nation to choose and freely to constitute the form of its own government." *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, LII., 398: J. H. Latané, *The U. S. & Latin America*, pp. 203, 204: *House Ex. Doc., 100-37th Cong., 2 Sess* 185, 187: P. F. Martin, *Maximilian in Mexico*, App. I., 436–438.

of that year. Great Britain and Spain soon settled their disputes with Mexico and withdrew from the enterprise; on the other hand, the French remained and seized Mexico City in 1863.

Thereafter France, by the aid of her forces, placed and supported Maximilian, an Austrian Prince, upon the Mexican throne, with the title of "Emperor of Mexico."[1] Maximilian's Government was recognized by most of the European Governments, but not by the United States.

William F. Seward, Secretary of State, replying to a suggestion that the United States join with the Allies in such intervention, stated that,

> "The United States, so far as it is practicable, prefer to adhere to a traditional policy recommended to them by the Father of their country and confirmed by a happy experience, which forbids them from making alliances with foreign nations: Second, Mexico being a neighbor of the United States on this continent, and possessing a system of government similar to our own in many of its important features, the United States . . . cherish . . . a lively interest in its security, prosperity and welfare."[2]

By reason of the relations of the North and the South, Mr. Seward at that time, could take no risk of involving the United States in war with any other country, and insistence upon the "Monroe Doctrine" in so many words would probably have meant the recognition of the Confederate States by some such nation or nations and consequently war.[3]

Although the words "Monroe Doctrine" were not used, Seward asserted in as diplomatic a way as possible under the circumstances those principles of the traditional American foreign policy which were the basis of the Monroe Doctrine.[4] When, however, after the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the Civil War began to turn in favor of the Union, Seward changed his method of meeting the situation and spoke more boldly.[5]

On September 26, 1863, Secretary Seward declared:

> "Their [United States] own safety and the cheerful destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions throughout

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[1]Wharton, *Dig. of Int. Law*, I, 299-338: J. H. Latené, *The U. S. & Lat. Am.*, pp. 193-237.

[2]*House Ex. Doc. 100–37 Cong. 2 sess.*, pp. 187–190: *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, LII, 394–397.

[3]A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 148, 149: J. H. Latané, *The U. S. & Latin American* pp. 217, 218: *Sen. Ex. Doc. 11–38th, Cong., 1 Sess.* p. 471.

[4]J B. Moore, *Prin. of Am. Diplom.*, p. 260.

[5]J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin America*, p. 226.

America . . . In no case are we likely to neglect such provision for our own safety as every sovereign state must always be prepared to fall back upon."[1]

On April 4, 1864, the House of Representatives declared that,

"The Congress of the United States . . . declare that it does not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge any monarchial Government erected on the ruins of any republican Government in America under the auspices of any European Power."[2]

In 1865 about 100,000 Union troops, released from war service were sent to the Texas border, under General Sheridan, and on November 6, 1865, Mr. Seward, through John Bigelow, our Minister at Paris, notified France that

"The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico and its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause of serious concern to the United States." . . .[3]

On February 12, 1866, with the Civil War well out of the way, Seward demanded that France state definitely when she intended to withdraw her forces from Mexico,[4] and on April 6, 1866, Napoleon III., confronted with the insistence of the United States upon this principle of the doctrine, issued the necessary orders for such withdrawal.[5] Maximilian's Empire collapsed in 1867 and the republic was restored.

B. SPAIN

As has been stated, Spain acted for a time with France and England in the matter of intervention in Mexico in 1861. One reason for her withdrawal from that expedition was a desire to concentrate her efforts in an attempt to reconquer Santo Domingo. In pursuance of this design Spain sent troops to Santo Domingo in 1861, whereupon the Dominicans appealed to the United States.

Mr. Seward then notified Spain that the United States,

"Would be obliged to regard them [the proceedings] as manifesting an unfriendly spirit towards the United States."[6]

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[1] *Diplomatic Corresp.* (1863), II., 709.
[2] J. B. Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 496.
[3] *Ms. Instr. France*, XVII., 46.
[4] *House Ex. Doc., 93—39th, Cong. 1 sess.*
[5] *Ibid*, 42.
[6] Seward to Tassara, Apr. 2, 1861, *MS. Notes to Span. Leg.*, VII., 200: Moore *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI. 515.
Seward to Schurtz, Apr. 2, 1861, *MS. Inst. Spain*, XV., 263: Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 515.

Spain, however, in spite of this protest, annexed Santo Domingo, the United States at the time being too much concerned with the Civil War to carry her protest to actual hostilities. In view of Seward's attitude toward the occupation of Santo Domingo, however, there can be no serious doubt but that the United States when free of her domestic difficulties, would have insisted upon the applicability of the Doctrine, and would have made the same demand upon Spain to evacuate Santo Domingo that she made upon France with reference to Mexico.

However, before that time arrived, Spain, finding the task too great, relieved the United States of that necessity by withdrawing from the island, definitely abandoning the project on April 30, 1865.[1]

C. GERMANY

Shortly after the settlement of the Venezuelan boundary question between Venezuela and Great Britain, which will be referred to hereafter, Germany and Great Britain in 1902, made demands upon Venezuela arising out of alleged mistreatment of their subjects. Other claims of Germany were based on contracts between German subjects and the government of Venezuela.[2] Both European Powers agreed to, and effected, a reprisal program, which included a blockade of Venezuelan ports, and the seizing of Venezuelan warships,[3] in which procedure they were joined by Italy. Germany apparently was determined to make a test of the Monroe Doctrine, at the exact time when the United States was negotiating a treaty with Colombia for the lease of a canal route across the Isthmus of Panama.[4]

The American minister to Venezuela, acting under instructions of the State Department, persuaded Venezuela to agree to recognize the principle of the claims and to arbitrate the amounts of them.[5] Great Britain and Italy also agreed to this proposition, but Germany declined,[6] and it was only by reason of the direct pressure exerted upon Germany by President Roosevelt that Germany finally consented to arbitrate. Mr. Roosevelt informed the German ambassador at Washington that unless Germany agreed to arbirtrate, Admiral Dewey and the American fleet, then manœuvering around the West Indies, would be ordered to Venezuelan waters in ten days. A week later when the German ambassador declared that no word upon the matter had been received from his

[1] Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 517, 518.

[2] *Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.* (1901), p. 193: *Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.* (1903), pp. 427–429.

[3] *Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.* (1903) 419–454: Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VII., 140.

[4] T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 268, 269.

[5] Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 590.

[6] J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin America*, p. 252.

government, Roosevelt stated that Admiral Dewey's orders would be issued one day earlier, and gave Germany forty-eight hours to agree to arbitrate her claims. Within thirty-six hours Germany consented to do so.[1]

At the outset, Secretary of State, Hay, had notified Germany that President Roosevelt had stated in his message to Congress of December 3, 1901.

> "We do not ask under this doctrine [Monroe] for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American State. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the requisition of territory by any non-American power."[2]

When, however, Germany, with the justice of her claim, conceded, refused to arbitrate the amount, it began to look as if Germany had some ulterior motive in such refusal. Particularly significant was this refusal in view of Germany's desire for colonies.

Germany came into the field for colonies about 1890, after all available spots for colonization had been occupied by other nations. Her demand for colonies, therefore, meant their seizure from other powers. In this respect South America offered an attractive field, particularly in view of the number of German emigrants located there.[3]

When, therefore, Germany refused arbitration, President Roosevelt, without discussing in words the traditional foreign policy of the United States, and without referring to the Monroe Doctrine by name, all of which was well known to Germany, at once brought into action the one force which has always stood behind that policy, *viz.*, the American fleet, and indicated to the world in a most positive way that the United States intended to fight if necessary in support of that policy. The intimation itself, however, was sufficient.

D. JAPAN

In 1912 Japan was generally supposed to be engaged in an attempt to secure control of land in Magdalena Bay on the Pacific Coast of Mexico. It was reported that the purchase had been, or was to be negotiated in the name of a Japanese company.[4] Such an indirect method of securing a foothold in the Western hemisphere would be most ingenious, for while nominally title to such territory might be in the subjects of Japan, yet in time of the Empire's need the holdings of such

[1] W. R. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay*, II., 286–288.

[2] J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the President s*, pp. 6662–6663; J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin America*, pp. 252–255.

[3] A. B Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 269–278.

[4] *Congressional Record, 62nd Congress, 2nd Sess.*, XLVIII., 5661–5663.

subjects, to all intents and purposes would be the holdings of Japan.

The situation appeared to be so threatening that Senator Lodge introduced into the United States Senate a resolution which was adopted in the following form:

> "Resolved, that when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor, or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power or control for military or naval purposes."[1]

Close analysis of this resolution shows the application of the same principle of our foreign policy as that upon which was based Monroe's message of December 2, 1823. Resting upon the same right of national self-preservation, and denying any foreign nation the right to interfere in purely American concerns, the Lodge resolution follows closely and logically the traditional American foreign policy. Lest, however, there be any doubt in the minds of any foreign statesmen, as to the exact extent to which such principle was applicable, this resolution proclaims definitely that the United States understands that the policy applies to all non-American Powers, Asiatic as well as European, and to all attempts, direct or indirect, to secure any foothold upon the two American continents.

E.—GREAT BRITAIN

At the time that the Holy or Quadruple Alliance was threatening to intervene in the affairs of the Spanish-American colonies, Great Britain was interested in preventing France from extending her power to Spanish-America. As has been stated, Great Britain had secured great commercial advantages in the South American countries by reason of Spain's difficulties. Her desire for a joint declaration with the United States was to prevent such an intervention.

Canning's suggestion was apparently designed to make it impossible for the United States to secure any territory in Spanish-America, and he was greatly disappointed when the United States, refusing such a joint declaration, enunciated the Monroe Doctrine. That doctrine was aimed not only at the intervention threatened, but was also directed against any new colonization or extension of the political system of any European power to the American Continents. This struck

[1] *Cong. Rec. 62nd Cong., 2nd Sess.*, XLVIII, 9923.

at Great Britain more than at any other nation by reason of her holdings on these continents which she could not thereafter extend save at the risk of war with the United States.

Great Britain's earlier activities with reference to Cuba have already been referred to, as have also Great Britain's activities in Mexico in 1861 and in Venezuela in 1902.

(a) As to Cuba.

In 1840 considerable agitation was caused by the report that Great Britain was about to annex or seize Cuba. On July 15, 1840, Secretary of State Forsyth wrote our Minister to Spain that,

> "the United States will prevent it [transfer of title or possession to Cuba from Spain to Great Britain] . . . at all hazards . . . and . . . in case of any attempt . . . to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it."[1]

In 1843 when British interference in Cuba was again feared, Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, wrote our Consul at Havana with reference to the same subject that,

> ". . . the United States never would permit the occupation of that Island by British . . . ".[2]

He also renewed the "guaranty" of assistance to Spain to prevent Cuba's being wrested from her. No definite action, other than as stated in the way of interfering with Cuba was taken at this time by Great Britain.

From 1849 to 1851 preparations were on foot for the invasion of Cuba from over seas, by armed bodies under the Cuban patriot, Lopez. At least three of these expeditions reached Cuba.[3] In 1851 British and French representatives at Washington notified our government that orders had been issued to their fleets, then in Cuban waters, to repel all attempts at invasion of Cuba. To this the United States replied that such steps could

> "not but be regarded . . . with grave disapproval, as involving on the part of European sovereigns combined action of protectorship over American waters."[4]

Thereafter, on April 23, 1852, Great Britain and France suggested that an abnegatory declaration as to Cuba be exe-

[1]Forsyth to Vail, July 15, 1840, *MS. Instr. Spain*, XIV., 111: *House Ex. Doc. 121–32nd, Cong. 1 Sess.*

[2]Webster to Campbell, *House Ex. Doc., 121—32nd, Cong., 1 Sess.*

[3]J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin Am.*, pp. 92–96.

[4]Curtis, *Life of Webster*, II., 551.

cuted by them and by the United States.[1] This proposition, however, was definitely rejected by the United States and the affair ended.

(b) As to Yucatan

In 1848 there was an Indian outbreak in Yucatan and the authorities of that country, apparently unable to cope with the outbreak, offered to transfer to the United States "the dominion and sovereignty" of that country. Similar offers were also made to Great Britain and Spain.

President Polk in a special message to Congress on April 29, 1848, while disclaiming any desire for the annexation of Yucatan, referred to the Monroe Doctrine and stated that,

> "according to our established policy, we could not consent to a transfer of this 'dominion and sovereignty' to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power."[2]

The trouble between the Indians and the Whites later blew over and no further action was taken by Yucatan, and there is no evidence that Great Britain ever pursued this offer of Yucatan.[3]

This subject is treated here, not because it amounted to any test of the Doctrine initiated by Great Britain, for it was not. It is so treated, merely because Yucatan offered to transfer sovereign rights in American territory to Spain and Great Britain, and Great Britain was the more able and likely to accept that offer.

(c) As to Belize, the Mosquito Coast, the Bay Islands, and Tigre Island.

The strip of territory bordering the Caribbean Sea, just south of Yucatan and known as British Honduras, or Belize, has been, and may yet be a cause of much concern between the United States and Great Britain. The territory was formerly a part of the Spanish province of Yucatan. A group of British adventurers, engaged in the business of cutting and exporting logwood, settled in this territory about 1682.[4] They were limited to certain territory by a concession from Spain. The settlers, however, constantly overstepped these limits and frequent trouble between the British and Spanish resulted.

In 1763 these nations sought to remedy the trouble by a treaty whereby Great Britain acknowledged Spain's sovereignty over Belize, and agreed to demolish all fortifications con-

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[1] *Sen. Ex. Doc.*, 13–32nd, *Cong., 2d sess.*

[2] *S. Ex. Docs. 40, 45, 49, 30th, Cong. 1, sess;* Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 423, 424.

[3] See generally *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, LI., 1184, et seq.

[4] A. R. Gibbs, *British Honduras*, p. 26.

structed therein by the British settlers.[1] The settlers, however, still persisted in extending the sphere of their operations, and, upon war with England breaking out in 1779, the Spanish destroyed the settlement.[2] Great Britain thereupon protested, but took no other action against Spain. In 1783 the British again entered Belize and engaged in their log wood activities, and again trouble began.[3]

On September 3, 1783, a new treaty was negotiated between Great Britain and Spain whereby Great Britain again recognized specifically the "rights of sovereignty of the King of Spain" over the district in question.[4] Friction arose, or rather continued, even after this treaty.[5]

Another treaty was therefore executed in 1786, which confirmed the prior treaties, and by the terms of which Spain allowed the British to extend their wood cutting, the "lands in question, however, being indisputably acknowledged to belong of right to the King of Spain."[6] Great Britain also agreed to evacuate "the country of the Mosquitoes as well as the continent in general and the islands adjacent." Trouble and warfare still persisted.

A new treaty was negotiated in 1814[7] which among other things provided for the ratification and confirmation of the status provided for in the treaty of 1786, which as has been said, expressly recognized the sovereignty of Spain over Belize.

In 1825 Great Britain suggested that the provisions of this 1786 treaty be incorporated in a proposed treaty between Great Britain and New Granada.[8] In 1831 she did likewise with reference to a proposed treaty with the Republic of Central America.[9] In 1826 she actually incorporated these provisions in her treaty with Mexico.[10]

It is clear therefore that up to 1831 Great Britain had never acquired, or, in fact, asserted any title to this territory.

The Bay Islands, a group of small islands off the coast of Belize provided with good harbors, were also Spanish territory, and no rights whatever under any of the treaties mentioned were ever accorded British subjects in these islands. On the contrary, the terms of the treaty of 1786 whereby Great Britain

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[1]L. Hertslet, *Collection of Treaties Between Great Britain and Other Powers*, II., 233–235.

[2]A. R. Gibbs, *British Honduras*, pp. 41, 42.

[3]L. Hertslet, *Collection of Treaties*, II, 237: A. R. Gibbs, *British Honduras*, 44, 45.

[4]L. Hertslet, *Collection of Treaties*, II., 235–241.

[5]A. R. Gibbs, *British Honduras*, 49–57.

[6]L. Hertslet, *Collection of Treaties*, II., 245, 255: A. R. Gibbs, *Br. Honduras*, pp. 46, 47: *Correspondence Relating to Interoceanic Canal etc.* (1885), pp. 171, 172.

[7]J. B. Henderson, Jr., *American Diplomatic Questions*, pp. 105, 106. L. Hertslet, *Collection of Treaties*, II., 269–273.

[8]T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 64.

[9]*Ibid*, p. 64.

[10]*Ibid*, p. 64.

agreed to abandon the continent and adjacent islands, included within their scope the abandonment of the Bay Islands.[1]

Such was the international status of Belize and the Bay Islands until 1822 when the Central American nations including Honduras established their independence. Belize and the Bay Islands then naturally came under the jurisdiction of Honduras. The title and the possession of Honduras to both remained unquestioned and undisputed until 1835, when the British settlers in Belize undertook to organize a local government which they styled "British Honduras," and in 1840 proclaimed that "the law of England is and shall be the law of this settlement or colony of British Honduras."[2]

British Honduras thereupon laid claim to the strip of coast, known as the Mosquito Coast, the eastern frontier of Honduras and Nicaragua, as far south as the San Juan River, which effectually dominated the eastern entrance of any interoceanic canal such as was then contemplated, through Nicaragua. The British claim to the Mosquito Coast rested upon the absurd theory that the tribe of Mosquito Indians who occupied it had sovereign rights over it, and had requested its establishment into a British Protectorate.

But in the Treaty of 1786 between Great Britain and Spain, the former recognized the sovereignty of the latter over the entire Mosquito Coast, which was an effectual denial of any sovereignty residing in the Mosquito Indians. In 1841 Great Britain announced this protectorate, and in 1848 in open defiance of the Monroe Doctrine drove all the Nicaraguans from the town of San Juan del Norte, at the Mouth of the San Juan River, occupied it, and called it Greytown.[3] The United States, however, never recognized any such sovereignty in the Mosquito Indians,[4] and protested against the establishment of any such alleged protectorate.

On October 16, 1849 British forces seized Tigre Island off the west coast of Honduras[5] which would control the western entrance of any interoceanic canal through Nicaragua.

Great Britain, therefore, in 1849 occupied Belize, the Mosquito Coast, and Tigre Island without title to any of them. There can be no question but that the Monroe Doctrine was violated by her then asserted possession of all these places. If the United States had considered the situation sufficiently menacing and had been ready to apply the Doctrine and the force necessary to maintain it, there was no valid reason why

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[1] Hertslet *Coll. of Treaties*, II., 237: A. R. Gibbs, *Br. Honduras*, pp. 44, 45.

[2] A. R. Gibbs, *Br. Honduras*, p. 92.

[3] J. B. Henderson, Jr., *Am. Diplo. Questions*, pp. 106, 107.

[4] Marcy to Ingersoll, June 9, 1843, *MS. Instr. Great Britain*, XVI., 210: Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 150, 151: Marcy to Buchanan, Aug. 6, 1855, *H. Ex. Doc. 1–34 Cong.—1 sess.*, 69, 71: Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 164: J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin Am.*, p. 158.

[5] J. B. Henderson, Jr., *Am. Diplo. Questions*, p. 109.

this country should not have done so. As a matter of fact, Mr. Clayton, then Secretary of State, began to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain to secure a settlement of the difficulties arising form Great Britain's activities in Central America. These negotiations were apparently entirely outside the Monroe Doctrine. At least both Clayton and Bulwer, the British diplomat, both so stated.[1]

By the terms of this Clayton-Bulwer treaty the United States and Great Britain agreed not to

> "occupy or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America."[2]

Almost immediately after the execution of this treaty, Great Britain asserted that Belize was not a part of "Central America" as that phrase was used in the treaty,[3] that such phrase applied only to the five republics formerly grouped in the "Republic of Central America,"[4] and hence that Belize did not come within the treaty requirement that Great Britain abandon such territory as she held in "Central America." Clayton for some reason agreed to this proposition,[5] and was most bitterly criticized therefor in Congress.[6] It is to be noted that although Belize was thereby excluded from "Central America," Honduras of which it had been and was a part, was included in "Central America" so defined.

In 1852 with this proposition apparently established, Great Britain, violating the treaty, seized the Bay Islands, contending that they were dependencies of Belize and on July 17, 1852, established them into the British "Colony of the Bay Islands." The United States protested against this seizure, contending that it was a violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.[7]

> "It seems to be a just conclusion that when in 1852 the Bay Islands were erected into a British 'colony' this was a flagrant infraction of the treaty; that as regards

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[1]Bulwer letter of June 29, 1850, Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 136, 137: Clarendon to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, *House Ex. Doc. 1–34 Cong. 1 sess.*, p. 119.

[2]Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Art. I. Moore's *Dig. Int Law*, III., 130.

[3]Bulwer letter, June 29, 1850: Moore's *Dig. Int. Law*, III., 136, 137: Wharton, *Dig. of Int. Law*, II., 190.

[4]Guatemala Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Honduras,—Clayton Speech in Senate, March 9, 1853,—*Cong. Globe, 32d. Cong. 2d. sess.*, p. 248.

D. G. Munroe, *The Five Republics of Central America.*

[5]Clayton to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, *House Ex. Doc.* 1–34, *Cong. 1 sess.*, 119: Moore's *Dig. of I t. Law*, 137.

[6]*Cong. Globe, 32, Cong. 2d. sess.*, App. 260–261.

[7]*Correspo. Relating to Interoceanic Canal, etc.*, 1885, 245: S. Douglass' speech, *Cong. Globe*, 32 *Cong. 2 Sess., App.* 260–261.

Belize, the American arguments were decidedly stronger and more correct historically."[1]

As a result of Great Britain's attitude trouble increased and the situation became very threatening.[2] The matter, however, was adjusted by a treaty between Great Britain and the Republic of Honduras, signed on November 28, 1859, providing for the recognition of the sovereignty of Honduras over the Bay Islands, and that part of the Mosquito Coast within the frontier of that republic,[4] and a treaty with Nicaragua, signed on January 28, 1860, recognizing the latter's sovereignty over that portion of the Mosquito Coast "within the frontier of that republic."[4] Though England in 1880 was reported to be then attempting to secure a cession of the Bay Islands from Honduras nothing ever developed from it.[5]

In 1888, and again in 1894 the United States protested against British interference in Mosquito Coast affairs,[6] in the latter year sending marines to Bluefields ostensibly to protect American interests, Great Britain having landed troops prior thereto.[7] On both occasions Great Britain alleged that her interference was to secure to the Mosquito Indians rights under the British treaty with Honduras of 1860. On November 20, 1894, the Mosquito Indians by a treaty surrendered to Nicaragua all their rights under the 1860 British treaty and this was ratified by Nicaragua on February 27, 1895. This new treaty removed any cause for further interference by Great Britain on that basis.[8]

This Clayton-Bulwer treaty, executed in 1850 has been charged up many times as a diplomatic defeat for this country. This charge has been based in part upon the fact that Great Britain, while apparently making great concessions, had nothing which she could concede, and that having no right in Central America, no such treaty should have been made with her. This charge has also been based on the fact that the Monroe Doctrine was not asserted against Great Britain as it might well have been.

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty had this effect, that whereas Great Britain had no legal rights in Central America, yet, by

[1]Cambridge Edition (1910) of the *Encylopedia Britannica*, vol. VI., 495.

[2]Buchanan's Message, Dec. 3, 1860, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, V., 639.

[3]*Br. & For. St. Pap.*, XLIX., 13: Moore's *Int. Arbitrations*, II., 2106.

[4]*Br. & For. St. Pap.*, L., 96–105: Moore's *Int. Arbitrations*, II., 2106.

[5]Evarts to Logan, Mar. 4, 1880—*MS. Instr. Cent. Am.* XVIII., 73: Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 432.

[6]Bayard to Phelps, Nov. 23, 1888, *House Ex. Doc., 50 Cong. 2d sess.*, vol. 1, Pt. I., 759–768.

[7]Gresham to Bayard, Apr. 30, 1894, Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 245.

[8]*Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.* (1894), Appendix I., 234–363: Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 250–252.

becoming a party to such treaty, she established a basis for her contention that she was to be considered in all future matters relative to an interoceanic canal across the Isthmus of Panama. The importance of that fact will be discussed hereafter.

(d) As to the Panama Canal

The affairs of Belize, the Bay Islands, and the Mosquito Coast are most intimately connected with the relations of the United States and Great Britain to the Panama Canal, and the importance of these places in the political relations between the two countries has been tremendously increased by the construction and operation of that interoceanic canal.

> "Its relation to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means of defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States."[1]

The control of the approaches to both sides of the canal are as important as the control of the canal itself, or to put it in other words, the nation that controls the islands or coasts by which vessels intending to use the canal must pass, effectually dominates that canal. In times of peace, that control furnishes coaling or oil stations, and reshipment points, which relate to commercial competition only, but in times of war, that control vitally affects the very existence of any nation depending upon that canal for the protection of its shores or of its communications. It is apparent that the nations controlling such strategic islands or coasts, are in possession of interior points, that is points upon the line of communications necessarily passing through the canal. They can base their war fleets, battleships, swift cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft upon such places, and can greatly curtail or even prevent merchantmen and warships from passing such points and from entering into the canal, by the simple process of harassing raids conducted from such points.[2]

It is to be noted that there is a semi-circle of islands in the Caribbean, which control the approach to the canal from the East. Jamaica which has been in British control since 1655, is the innermost of those islands, and hence the most valuable strategically, in that it controls all routes from the East, the other islands merely controlling certain alternative passages.[3] Various other islands control the passage into the Caribbean and to the Canal from the southeast. Bermuda and the Bahama Islands, also British, control the passage between them and the North American continent from the North Atlantic into the Carrib-

[1]Pres. Hayes' Message Mar. 8, 1880, *Messages & Papers of the Pres.*, VII., 585: *Sen. Ex. Doc., 112–46th, Cong. 2 sess.*

[2]A. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, pp. 29–35: *Naval Strategy*, pp. 38, 53, 102, 139, 382.

[3]A. Mahan, *Naval Strategy*, pp. 140, 194, 310, 316, 351–356.

bean, but are themselves subject to a later control from Florida, Cuba, Porto Rico and Jamaica.

The strategic value of Belize, the Bay Islands, and the Mosquito Coast is, therefore, at once apparent. They, with Jamaica, would constitute an effectual eastern control of the Canal.

Tigre Island occupies a somewhat similar position with reference to the western approach to the Canal. At the time of the seizures referred to the canal contemplated was one which would traverse Nicaraguan territory and these places occupied a much more important strategical position with reference to such a route, but their lessened importance with reference to the present canal is only a matter of degree.

Undoubtedly this was the reason why Great Britain, with her usual foresight, seized these places. By their possession she not only would exercise a military and strategic control over any canal, but also, if the seizures were recognized, would make herself a necessary party to all proceedings concerning Central America, and particularly concerning any interoceanic canal.

In 1846 the United States and Columbia (then New Granada) executed a treaty which was ratified in June, 1848, whereby Columbia guaranteed,

> "the United States that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama . . . shall be open and free to the . . . United States . . ."[1]

Apparently stirred by this treaty Great Britain, as has been stated seized and occupied Greytown in 1848[2], and Tigre Island in 1849[3] which gave absolute control over the east and west approach to any canal by way of the San Juan River through Nicaragua and Costa Rica, which then was the more preferred route for an interoceanic canal. These seizures and other activities of Great Britain in Central America led to much friction between this country and Great Britain resulting in the negotiation and execution of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

On June 21, 1849 Hise, our chargé in Central America, negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua which would give the United States exclusive rights to construct a canal through that country.[4] On September 16, 1849, Squier, our chargé in Honduras, negotiated a treaty with Honduras providing for the cession of Tigre Island to the United States.[5]

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[1] *Compilation of Treaties* (1904), pp. 194–206: *Corresp. in Relation to Interoceanic Canal., etc.* (1885), p. 5: Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 5–7.

[2] *H. Ex. Doc. 75–31st. Cong., 1 sess.*, 92–96.

[3] Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 135: *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, XL., 997–1002, 1019.

[4] *Interoceanic Canal Corresp.*, pp. 94–99; 133: *Br. & For. St. Pap.*, XL. 969.

[5] *Br. & For. S . Pap. XL.*, 997–1002, 1019.

On October 16, 1849 Chatfield, the British Minister to Guatemala, with an armed force took possession of Tigre Island as has been stated. The United States protested and Great Britain ordered the island restored to Honduras.[1] For some reason these treaties were never submitted to the Senate but were merely used as one basis for the negotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

Clayton apparently disregarded Great Britain's absolute lack of sovereignty in Belize, the Mosquito Coast, the Bay Islands, and Tigre Island in arriving at the terms of the treaty. This treaty is really the only occasion wherein the United States might be criticised for not asserting the Monroe Doctrine in all its force,[2] for clearly it applied to Great Britain's hold upon any part of Central America, which hold was the only reason for that nation being a party to such a treaty.[3] It is to be noted, however, that if British Honduras or Belize did not come within the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as Great Britain contended,[4] and as Clayton later stated,[5] which fact alone might be argued in favor of Clayton's manner of handling the treaty, then Great Britain's title to Belize was not recognized[6] and the Monroe Doctrine may still be applied.

As has been stated, this Clayton-Bulwer treaty was bitterly assailed in this country as a gratuitous concession to Great Britain, and as a surrender or sacrifice of the Monroe Doctrine. It does not in any way constitute such a surrender, for as was stated by Clayton, and Clarendon, it was negotiated without reference to the doctrine.[7]

In the discretion of the United States it was not then applied, the emergency apparently not being deemed sufficiently menacing to necessitate a resort to it,[8] or to the force necessary to maintain it; Great Britain's title to Belize however, was not

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[1]Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 135:

[2]Buchanan to McClernand, Apr. 2, 1850. in *Am. Hist. Rev.*, Oct. 1899

[3]J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin Am.*, p. 157.

[4]Bulwer Letter of June 29, 1850,—Moore's *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 136, 137: Clarendon to Buchanan, May 2, 1854, *House Ex. Doc., 1, 34 Cong., 1 sess., 89; Br. & For. St. Pap.*, XLVI., 267.

[5]Clayton letter to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, *H. Ex. Doc. 1, 34 Cong. 1 sess. 119.*

Clayton Speech in Senate, March 9, 1853, *Cong. Globe, 32nd Cong. 2d Sess.*, pp. 248–251.

[6]*Interoceanic Canal Correspondence*, etc. (1885) 234: Wharton's *Digest of Int. Law*, II., 190: Clayton to Bulwer, July 4, 1850, *H. Ex. Doc. 1-34th. Cong. 1st. sess.*, 119: Clayton Speech in Senate, March 9, 1853—*Cong. Globe, 32 Cong.–2d Sess., Appendix 248.*

Buchanan to Clarendon, July 22, 1854, Wharton, *Digest of Int. Law*, II., 193.

[7]*House Ex. Doc. 1–34, Cong., 1st. Sess.*, 89–119.

[8]Buchanan to Clarendon, Jan. 6, 1854, Wharton *Digest of Int. Law*, II., 191, 192.

recognized,[1] and if, in the future, her claims to Belize do constitute a menace to the peace and safety of the United States, the doctrine may then be resorted to.

The terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, applied to a canal through the territory of Nicaragua or Costa Rica, supposedly to be built soon thereafter by private capital, under the protection of both nations. It did not contemplate a canal to be built by the United States, with its own funds and upon its own territory.[2]

The Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, which superceded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty mentioned for the first time any canal to be constructed "under the auspices of the Government of the United States."[3] It also provided that "the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive rights of providing for the regulation and management of the canal." Even this Hay-Pauncefote treaty still contemplated the Nicaraguan Canal and did not refer to any canal to be built through United States territory.

The canal however, which was actually built traversed territory over which the United States had sovereign rights, and was built with American money. In addition to securing from the Republic of Panama the cession of the Canal Zone,[4] the United States acquired the rights of the French Canal Company. Hence, because of the fact that the canal was constructed through American territory instead of through foreign territory, neither the Clayton-Bulwer treaty nor the Hay-Pauncefote treaty apply to the present canal,[5] for it is well settled that treaties made with reference to known conditions existing at the time of such execution cease to be obligatory "so soon as the conditions upon which they were executed, are essentially altered."[6]

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[1]The Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate on February 11, 1853, reported a resolution to the Senate to the effect that the exchange of ratifications after this Bulwer reservation amounted to an admission by both nations that "nothing contained in the treaty [Clayton-Bulwer] was to be considered as affecting the title or existing rights of Great Britain to the English settlements in Honduras Bay. . . " *Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 2 sess., p. 567.*

[2]Clayton-Bulwer Treaty Preamble, Arts. I, VIII: *Compilation of Treaties in Force*, (1904), pp. 327, 328: *Correspondence in Rel. to Interoceanic Canal (1885)*, pp. 99–101.
Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, III., 130:
J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin Am.*, pp. 144, 145, 165.

[3]*Compilation of Treaties (1904)* pp. 380–382: *Senate Ex. Doc. 85,—57th Cong. 1st. sess.* 7: Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, III., 219–221.: M. Poindexter, *American Rights in Panama*, in *Forum*, February, 1921.

[4]*Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.* (1904), p. 543: *Compilation of Treaties* (1904), pp. 609–616.

[5]M. Poindexter, *Am. Rights in Panama*, in *Forum*, Feb., 1921, pp. 134, 136.
Hannis Taylor, *Int. Pub. Law*, pp. 148, 400.

[6]Hannis Taylor, *Int. Pub. Law*, p. 400: Oppenheim *Int. Law*, I. 550.

Acting upon this principle Congress enacted a law in 1912 which exempted American vessels from the payment of canal tolls. This, however, was only after a long and bitter debate in which the British contention was most vigorously put forward that Great Britain's rights under the Hay-Pauncefote treaty would be infringed in that the provision as to the canal being "free and open to the vessels of . . . of all nations . . . on terms of entire equality," prohibited such toll exemption.

In 1914 President Wilson under a veiled implication as to difficult international relations, requested Congress to repeal that law, which Congress did.[1]

In 1921 Senator Borah introduced a bill into the Senate to re-establish that toll exemption.

The United States has the right to establish such rules governing American ships with reference to the use of the Canal as it deems proper, particularly is this true as to coastwise ships which must necessarily be American. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty, apart from its abrogation in 1901, had been previously broken by Great Britain, by the refusal to withdraw from Central America and by her seizure of the Bay Islands and therefore no longer bound the United States, if they elected not so to be bound.[2] The Hay-Pauncefote treaty does not apply in that it referred to conditions which did not attend the construction of the present Canal. Even if it did apply, the phrase "open to the vessels . . . of all nations . . . on terms of entire equality" logically refer to nations other than the United States. That this is so is indicated by the position of Great Britain in not contending that United States naval vessels should pay tolls, as they do not, while those of other nations do. It would be absurd to make such a contention because it would simply mean that the United States would pay tolls to itself. Yet the same provisions in the treaty covers "vessels of commerce and war."

This question of tolls is but an incidental question, the settlement of which however, will have a distinct effect upon the future of this country, because while it is but an incident in the affairs of the canal it really goes to the gist of the question of whether the United States is to be the exclusive sovereign over its own territory. Its settlement may have, and undoubtedly will have a very vital effect upon the future of the Monroe Doctrine.

(e) As to Venezuela.

Great Britain secured title to British Guiana from Holland under the treaty of 1814. The territory then ceded, however, was merely described as, "the establishments of Demarara,

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[1]As to this implication see *The London Letters of Walter H. Page*, in *World's Work*, Sept., 1921.

[2]Frelinghuysen Despatch, May 8, 1882, *Corresp. re Interoceanic Canal, etc.* (1885), pp. 160, 161.

Essequibo, and Berbice," and thenceforth the boundary of this ceded territory was in dispute.[1]

Great Britain began pushing her claim of jurisdiction north and west, and in 1841 sent Schomburgk, an engineer to Guiana, to erect boundary posts.[2] These were erected far to the north and west of any previous boundary claims, but were asserted by Great Britain to be merely "a preliminary measure,"[3] and to leave open for discussion the determination of the correct boundary. Gradually, while Venezuela was constantly protesting against the encroachment, British colonists pushed still further north and west into Venezuelan territory, and Great Britain pushed its claim of title north and west with them. Venezuela frequently appealed to Great Britain to arbitrate, but Great Britain constantly refused, or offered to arbitrate only a part of that territory which Venezuela claimed to be improperly occupied by Great Britain, and refused to arbitrate title to any territory within the Schomburgk "preliminary" line.[4]

President Cleveland, in a special message to Congress on December 17, 1895,[5] which was based to a large extent on a despatch which Richard Olney, Secretary of State, had sent to Great Britain, on July 20, 1895,[6] and Lord Salisbury's reply thereto of November 26, 1895,[7] insisted that the Monroe Doctrine controlled the situation and, called for the appointment of an American Commission which was to be sent to Venezuela to report to the United States upon the true boundary. If Great Britain persisted in claiming beyond that, it would undoubtedly have meant war, for President Cleveland in that same message said,

> "When such report is made and accepted, it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow.
>
> I am, nevertheless, firm in my conviction that while it is a grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors in the onward march of civilization,

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[1] J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin America*, p. 238.
[2] G. Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, pp. 178, 182.
[3] *Ibid*, pp. 178–180.
[4] *Ibid*, pp. 177–270.
[5] *Sen. Ex. Doc. 31—54 Cong., 1st. sess.;* Richardson's *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, IX., 655.
[6] *Sen. Ex. Doc. 31—54 Cong. 1st. sess.*, p. 4.
[7] *Ibid*, 22.

and strenuous and worthy rivals in all arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great nation can invite which equals that which follows a supine submission to wrong and injustice, and the consequent loss of national self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended a people's safety and greatness."

Lord Salisbury in his reply to Olney had denied the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine to the situation. For a time affairs were very threatening. Great Britain however, capitulated and agreed to arbitrate the matter with Venezuela. Strangely enough, considering Great Britain's prior refusals to arbitrate, the decision was in a great measure, to the advantage of Great Britain.[1]

Cleveland and Olney have been many times criticised for their handling of this situation. But their insistence upon the Monroe Doctrine and its applicability was as logical, cogently reasoned, and as thoroughly American in its purpose and effect as well might be desired. The later developments in the Caribbean and in the Isthmus of Panama prove that both Cleveland and Olney had the foresight which probably saved this country much future trouble.

"It was a great triumph of American diplomacy."[2]

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[1]G. Cleveland, *Presidential Problems*, 272–277.
[2]J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin America*, p. 249.

CHAPTER IX.—COMMENTS, CRITICISMS, AND FALLACIES

Many mistakes and misinterpretations have arisen relative to the Monroe Doctrine such as the following:

A. That George Canning, the British statesman, was the author of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the British fleet has ever supported it.

B. That the Monroe Doctrine has been changed, or extended beyond its original scope.

C. That the Monroe Doctrine is a guaranty given by the United States to Spanish America.

D. That the Monroe Doctrine has not been consistently applied by the United States.

E. That the Doctrine is a prohibition against the acquisition of new territory by the United States.

A. British Authorship and Support of the Monroe Doctrine.

It has been frequently said by Americans as well as by others that the Monroe Doctrine was suggested by George Canning and that the credit of originating it should be his.[1] In this respect it is interesting to note that Canning's biographer does not go so far, as he merely states that Canning's acts "encouraged, if it did not originate," the Doctrine.[2] In addition to, and in connection with this, it is also frequently stated that from 1823 to date the Monroe Doctrine has rested upon, and has been supported by the "broad back of the British fleet."[3] A mere cursory study of the Monroe Doctrine, its origin, and its history, utterly disproves both statements, and emphasizes the fact that in its philosophy, its origin and its history, as has been admitted by Reddaway, the British writer, it is essentially and solely American,[4] and that far from being supported, it has never been recognized as a controlling principle by any great power, but has always been challenged and opposed by all the European powers, including Great Britain.

The allegation of British authorship rests practically upon the following basis:

(a) Canning's inquiry of Rush on August 16, 1823, as to the possibility of the United States joining with Great Britain in a

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[1]"The Monroe Doctrine, as now familiarly called, proceeded from Canning. He was its inventor, promoter, and champion, at least so far as it bears against European intervention in American affairs." W. G. Sumner, *Prophetic Voices Concerning America*, p. 157: T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 51: J. S. Ewart, *The Canning Policy*, in *Kingdom Papers*, No. 16, pp. 171, 173. Mr. Ewart even says that "Canning persuaded Monroe to send to Congress his message." (J. S. Ewart, *Kingdom Papers*, I, No. 6.

[2]A. G. Stapleton, *Political Life of George Canning*, II., 39.

[3]Owen Wister, *A Square Deal*, pp. 120, 137.

[4]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 28.

"joint declaration" opposing intervention by France or the Holy Alliance in Spanish America.[1]

(b) Canning' letter of August 20, 1823, to Rush relative to his earlier inquiry, and stating his five propositions underlying Great Britain's attitude toward the Spanish colonies.[2]

(c) Canning's speech of December 12, 1826, defending his position with reference to the French invasion of Spain, in which he said:

> "I looked another way. I sought material for compensation in another sphere. . . . I called the NewWorld into existence, to redress the balance of the old."[3]

(d) Canning' letter of December 31, 1823, to Sir William à Court to the effect that,

> "while I was yet hesitating what shape to give to the declaration and protest which ultimately was conveyed in my conference with P. de Polignac; and while I was more doubtful as to the effect of that protest and declaration, I sounded Mr. Rush (the American minister here) as to his powers and disposition, to join in any step which we might take to prevent a hostile enterprise on the part of the European powers against Spanish America. He had no powers; but he would have taken upon himself to join with us, if we would have begun by recognizing the Spanish-American States. But I have no doubt that his report to his government of this *sounding* (which he probably represented as an overture) I had a great share in producing the explicit declarations of the President."[4]

But an analysis of Canning's acts and statements, in addition to revealing the fact that he totally ignored the recognition of the South American nations by the United States, shows that he desired,

> 1. A joint declaration for the purpose of preventing *intervention* only.
>
> 2. A pledge from the United States that it would not in any way acquire any Spanish-American territory.[5]

A review of the cabinet discussions which took place prior to the publication of the message conclusively proves that both suggestions were voted down,[6] and that it was finally determined to answer the Russian Minister Von Tuyll, and to make that answer the vehicle for declaring to the world, the attitude of the United States toward the threat of the Holy Alliance against Spanish America, and toward Russia's claim to Oregon,

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[1]R. Rush, *The Court of London from 1819 to 1825*, pp. 361, 366.
[2]*Ibid*, 376, 378; *Mass. Hist. Soc. 2d. Series*, XV., 415, 416.
[3]Hansard, *Parl. Debates new series*, XVI, 398.
[4]A. G. Stapleton, *George Canning and his Times*, pp. 394–396.
[5]J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 177, 178.
[6]*Ibid*, VI., 178, 179.

thereby rendering any special answer to Canning unnecessary. According to Reddaway, a British writer, "the cabinet of Monroe was full of suspicion of Great Britain,"[1] believing, "both that Great Britain might be induced to return to her allegiance [to the Holy Alliance], and that the object of the European league was the overthrow of liberty, first in South and then in North America."[2] Canning's suggestion was not followed, therefore, and no claim of British authorship can properly be based upon that phase of the transactions.

Canning, patriotically and rightfully enough, believed that "The interests of his own native land, are those to which above all others a Statesman should attend."[3] Washington had the same belief.[4] Canning put that belief into practice, and his entire policy with reference to the Spanish-American colonies was based upon it. As Rush said, Canning's policy "was British selfishness . . . this was its beginning and its end; this its inspiring principle, and only aim."[5] His policy was "essentially British."[6]

Canning was interested only in preventing the threatened intervention by France or by the Holy Alliance, in Spanish-America, and that because of British interests.[7] France, by reason of her invasion of Spain in spite of British opposition, and by reason of the restoration of Ferdinand VII, a "legitimist" to the Spanish throne, had gained a great ascendancy in European political affairs. If France should undertake to suppress the revolution in the Spanish colonies and should succeed, it was probable that some of them would be expected by her, and would be ceded to her by Spain, as a recompense for her expense and effort. As has been stated, Great Britain, as a result of these revolutions, had secured an immense trade with the Spanish-American nations, which had been denied her before, and undoubtedly would be denied her again if Spain or France should secure possession of them.

The large and powerful merchant class of England was rising in protest against any conditions which would curtail British trade, and was insisting that such intervention by France would accomplish that end, and hence must be prevented. Great Britain's "newly-won commercial supremacy must be maintained and developed."[8] In other words, British commerce "was the lode star of the British statesman."[9]

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[1]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 40.

[2]*Ibid*, 19; Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823, *Mass. Hist. Soc., 2d Series*, XV., 434–436.

[3]A. G. Stapleton, *Political Life of George Canning*, I., 134.

[4]H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II., 144.

[5]R. Rush, *The Court of London from 1819 to 1825*, p. 466.

[6]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 1, 3.

[7]*Ibid*, 17.

[8]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 12, 13.

[9]*Ibid*, pp. 21, 23: Rush to Adams, Dec. 27, 1823, *Mass. Hist. Soc., 2d Series*, XV., 434–436; G. F. Tucker, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 8.: A. Mahan, *The Monroe Doctrine* in *National Review* (1903), XL., 874.

Castlereagh had been Metternich's "second self" so far as legitimacy went,[1] and his successor, George Canning, in opinion, also was a "legitimist" from beginning to end.[2] However Canning decided that the principles of "legitimacy" must, as a practical matter, yield to the interests of commerce. He, therefore, endeavored by every means possible to prevent intervention, and when he felt that he could not count on a joint declaration with the United States, he secured from France a declaration to the effect that she would not intervene.[3] Having received such an assurance, on October 9, 1823[4] he took no further steps toward joint action with the United States.

Canning was not in accord with the fundamental basis of the Monroe Doctrine, *viz.*, the protection of republican principles in the United States by the protection of the same principles in South as well as Central America. This is clearly shown by his letter to Sir William à Court, already referred to, dated December 31, 1823, in part as follows:

> "Monarchy in Mexico and monarchy in Brazil would cure the evils of universal democracy and prevent the drawing of the line of demarcation which I most dread—America *vs.* Europe. The United States naturally enough, aim at this division and cherish the democracy which leads to it."[5]

It is clear, then, that Canning merely desired to prevent intervention. He never anticipated, and never accepted the other principle laid down in Monroe's mesage to the effect that the American continents were no longer subjects for future colonization. In a letter to Bagot, the British Minister at Washington, dated January 9, 1824, Canning said,

> "It is hardly necessary for me to add . . . that the principle . . . prohibiting colonization . . . is as new to this Government as that of France."[6]

He wrote Granville on December 17, 1824, a year later, that

> "The fight has been hard, but it is won. Spanish America is free; and if we do not mismanage our matters sadly, she is English."[7]

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[1]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 18, 22, 24.
T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 49.

[2]"I am no more a lover of revolution than Prince Metternich. I have certainly passed near thirty years in fighting for old institutions." (Stapleton's *George Canning and his Times*, 380): W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 24: R. Rush, *The Court at London, from 1819–1825*, p. 467.

[3]A. G. Stapleton, *Political Life of George Canning*, II., 26.

[4]*Ibid*, II., 26, 32.

[5]A. G. Stapleton, *George Canning and his Times*, 394–396: Moore's *Digest of Int. Law*, VI., 410.

[6]C. H. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 85.

[7]A. G. Stapleton, *George Canning and His Times*, pp. 407–411.

This may have referred to commercial relations and it may also have referred to something more than mere commercial relations.

Canning asserted further that,

> "Great Britain could not acknowledge the right of any power to proclaim such a principle, much less to bind other countries to the observance of it. If we [Great Britain] were to be repelled from the shores of America, it would not matter to us whether that repulsion were effected by the Ukase of Russia excluding us from the sea, or by the new Doctrine of the President prohibiting us from the land. But we cannot yield obedience to either."[1]

He also contended that,

> "The principle was one which his Majesty's Ministers were prepared to combat in the most unequivocal manner."[2]

This principle indeed was aimed at Great Britain as much, as it was aimed at any other nation. Considering Great Britain's apparent designs in the Northwest, in the West Indies, and in Central as well as South America, that principle, if carried out by the United States, would work to Great Britain's very great disadvantage. In effect it created a deadlock with Great Britain.[3] Accordingly Canning challenged this principle to the very end and never accepted it,[4] which is rather convincing evidence that he, at least, never claimed any credit for authorship of that principle.

If other proof were needed, however, it is at hand in ample quantity. Canning's first reported conversation upon this matter with Mr. Rush was on August 16, 1823, and his first letter to Mr. Rush on August 20, 1823. It was on the first of these occasions that Canning inquired as to the possibility of a joint declaration, and on the latter that he suggested his five principles already referred to. Clearly, if there was any British authorship of the Monroe Doctrine, it must be found in the transactions covered by these two occasions. But if the primary principles enunciated by President Monroe had been enunciated prior to August, 1823, Canning can not, of course, be regarded as the father of them.

The "Non-colonization" principle had been set forth by Adams in his conference upon the Oregon situation with Von Tuyll on July 17, 1823,[5] and again in his letter of instructions to Rush of July 22, 1823,[6] and in a similar letter sent at the same

[1]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine* p. 97: J. B. Henderson, Jr. *Am. Diplo. Questions*, p. 339.

[2]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 97.

[3]*Ibid*, p. 114.

[4]W. F. Johnson, *America's Foreign Relations*, p. 349: R. Rush, *The Court at London, from 1819–1825*, p. 419.

[5]J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, VI., 163.

[6]*Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.*, V., 447.

time to Middleton, our Minister to Russia.[1] The first of these events antedated by a month Canning's first talk with Mr. Rush. Canning could not possibly have been a "posthumous" father.

The other principle of "non-intervention" by European nations was more or less definitely suggested by Washington in 1792, when he refused to permit any interposition or mediation by Great Britain in the struggle then going on between the United States and the Indians. It was developed by the repeated declarations against Spain's transfer of Cuba to any other power. It was most definitely proclaimed in 1811 by President Madison[2] and approved by Congress with reference to Florida. Madison's message of 1811 and Monroe's of 1823, were both based upon the same principle *viz.*, that the "United States had the right to limit the action of foreign powers with regard to territory within the western hemisphere but beyond their own borders, in order to prevent possible injury to their interests."[3]

On May 13, 1818, more than five years before Canning's talk with Rush, Monroe proposed at a cabinet meeting the following:

> "Whether Ministers of the United States in Europe shall be instructed that the United States will not join in any project of interposition between Spain and the South Americans, which should not be to promote the complete independence of those provinces."[4]

With this principle clearly enunciated some twelve years before Monroe's message, and suggested by Monroe himself over five years before it, the claim of British authorship does not rest on very secure foundations.

As a matter of fact, Canning denied any connection with the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, and very carefully pointed out to France the difference between Great Britain's principles and those set forth in Monroe's message.[5]

The most conclusive evidence against Canning is furnished by Canning himself. In a letter to Bagot dated January 9, 1824, recently discovered, Canning said,

> "The first and most essential difference is that . . . The United States have actually acknowledged the independence of the late Spanish Colonies, while His Majesty's Government continues still to withhold such recognition. . . . . If the message . . . is to be considered as objecting to an attempt to recover her dominions on the part of Spain

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[1] *Ibid*, 436.

[2] W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 9.

[3] *Ibid*, p. 10.

[4] J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, IV., 91–92.

[5] W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 95, 96, 97.

herself, there is again as important a difference between his [Monroe] view of the subject and ours as perhaps it is possible to conceive."[1]

The policy of non-intervention and neutrality established by Washington at least as early as 1793 was novel to the world. It was the logical outcome of the great struggle for liberty. The development of that principle into "America,—hands off Europe," and "Europe,—hands off America" was just as logical and as purely American. As Reddaway, the British author, puts it,

> "For forty years the United States had been hastening toward the position that they assumed in 1823."[2]

Far from being suggested by British statesmen, it is a most distinctively American creation. Reddaway says that "the negotiations between Rush and Canning merely determined the time and manner of the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine."[3] This is the most that can truthfully be said of Canning's conferences with Rush.

The claim that the Monroe Doctrine has rested for its support upon the British fleet is just as unsound as is the claim of British authorship. A review of the events in which the doctrine was tested shows that at no time was Great Britain or the British fleet supporting the position of the United States, but on the other hand was either engaged in an individual effort of Great Britain's, or was indifferently disposed, while Great Britain consented to the effort of some other nation to test the doctrine, *e.g.*, Great Britain's attempt on Cuba in 1825, on Venezuela from 1840 to 1895, her joint attempts with Spain and France resulting in the French invasion of Mexico in 1862, and her joint effort with Italy and Germany against Venezuela in 1902.

The closest approach to any basis of fact for such a statement is furnished by the reported action of the British fleet with respect to the German Fleet in Manila Bay in 1898, at the time when Admiral Dewey was preparing for his attack upon the Spanish forts. However, at that time Germany was just eight years advanced on her naval colonial expansion program, which ultimately brought on the World War in 1914. She was then fast becoming a great commercial and territorial rival of Great Britain. She had already acquired coaling stations and other possessions throughout the world. Great Britain, therefore, feared Germany and any effort which might have been exerted by the British Fleet at that time was a measure of self-protection for Great Britain and not of friendliness toward the United States, or in support of the Monroe Doctrine.

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[1]Charles H. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 84, 85.
[2]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine* p. 3.
[3]*Ibid*, 14.

The Monroe Doctrine, therefore, is a policy thoroughly American in its conception, development and application. It "was formulated by Americans to promote American interests."[1] For its efficacy it has rested solely upon the power of the United States and must necessarily continue so to do.

B. The Monroe Doctrine and Changes, or Extensions Thereof.

There are some critics of the Monroe Doctrine who, in effect, hold that the original Monroe Doctrine no longer exists,[2] that it has been expanded,[3] enlarged, warped or distorted so that in its present state neither President Monroe nor John Quincy Adams would recognize it as their "literal teaching."[4] There is, of course, no question but that the particular circumstances which obtained in 1823 have long since ceased to exist. The message of Monroe, however, was not intended to be limited to those particular circumstances, but was intended to set forth general principles[5] subject to future application as circumstances might require. Its terminology, general in character, the antecedent cabinet discussions, the statements and understanding of those who had to do with it, all point to the fact that it was not a mere statement of policy for that period only. Jefferson, for instance, in his letter to President Monroe of October 24, 1823, preceding the drafting of the message, and referring to the principles set forth in the message, said

> "This sets our compass and points the course which we are to steer through the ocean of time opening on us. . . . Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs.
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> "We will oppose with all our means, the forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and more especially their transfer to any other power by conquest, cession or acquisition in any other way."[6]

The grounds generally stated in support of the assertion of a change in, or enlargement of the Doctrine are the following:

(a) Henry Clay's notification to France of October 25, 1825, that the United States

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[1]W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 28.

[2]J. B. Henderson, Jr., *Am. Diplo. Questions*, pp. 293, 294, 448: W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 2, 22, 23, 29, 37, 38: H. Bingham, *The Monroe Doctrine, An Obsolete Shibboleth, Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1913.

Lord Bryce, *The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations,—The Nation*, Dec. 13, 1917.

[3]A. C. Coolidge, *The U. S. as a World Power*, p. 101.

[4]A. C. Coolidge, *The U. S. as a World Power*, p. 107.

[5]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 107.

[6]Ford's *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, X., 277–278.

"Could not consent to the occupation of the islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other European power than Spain under any circumstances whatever."[1]

This is alleged to be the "first distinct official statement that it is contrary to the interests of the United States and forbidden by the Monroe Doctrine for any European colony in the Americas to be transferred to another European Power."[2]

(b) President Polk's message of December 2, 1845, to Congress in which he said,

"It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent."[3]

It is contended that the words "or dominion" constitute an extension of the Doctrine in that it prevents any European nation from securing territory by purchase or cession, in effect prohibiting any European interference on the North American continent.[4]

(c) President Grant's special message of May 31, 1870, in which he said,

"I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European Power."[5]

It is alleged that this prohibition of Spanish-American States from transferring American territory to European nations is an enlargement of the Doctrine.

(d) President Cleveland's special message to Congress of December 17, 1895, in which he stated that the Monroe Doctrine "has its place in the code of international law."[6] It is asserted that this amounts to a claim of a status which the doctrine has never attained.

(e) Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's pronouncement relative to Venezuela in 1895:

"The Monroe Doctrine . . . is merely the declaration that no foreign power must establish a new government, acquire new territory by purchase or force or by any method whatever, or seek to control existing Governments in the Americas."[7]

It is asserted that this use of the word "foreign" is an extension

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[1] *Am. S. Pap. For. Rel.*, V., 855: Moore's, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI, 447.

[2] W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, 5, 6: A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 90, 91: J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin America*, pp. 323, 324.

[3] J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, pp. 2248–2249: *Sen. Doc. 1-29 Cong. 1 sess.*, 14–15: Moore's Dig. *of Int. Law*, VI., 420.

[4] W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 9: H. Bingham, *The Monroe Doctrine, An Obsolete Shibboleth.*

[5] J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, pp. 4015.

[6] *Ibid*, pp. 6088–6090.

[7] *Cong. Rec. 54th, Cong. 1st Sess.;* 413-420.

to all foreign powers, Asiatic as well as European; that the words "by any method whatever" is a distinct departure from the message of Monroe.

(f) The Senate Resolution, offered by Senator Lodge, in 1912, relative to Magdalena Bay.

> "Resolved, that whenever any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or safety of the United States, the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government, not American, as to give that Government practical power, or control for naval or military purposes."[1]

It is contended that this is an enlargement in that it applies not only to Asiatic powers, but also to the acquisition of territory by agencies other than national governments.[2]

In spite of these contentions it is safe to say that the Monroe Doctrine has not been changed. As has been stated, the purpose of the message was to declare a general principle parallel with that of Washington's of non-intervention in European affairs. The underlying principle was to prevent any foreign political influence of any kind from getting such a foothold on the American continents that it might be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States. One reasonable way to determine whether the doctrine has been changed in its application to any given circumstances is to consider how Monroe and John Quincy Adams would have viewed those same circumstances. To hold that President Monroe and Secretary Adams intended to exclude future colonization by a non-American nation solely because it might endanger this country, and at the same time to assert that he did not intend to cover the purchase of territory by such a nation, or by a fictitious person created by such a nation, is to strain at the gnat and to swallow the camel. In fact John Quincy Adams, referring to Polk's message already quoted, said that he "approved entirely."[3]

The Statement of Jefferson quoted above shows most clearly that it was intended to apply the principle to all non-American interposition in American political affairs, direct or indirect, and under any form or pretext such interposition might take.

The doctrine is strictly limited as to its scope.[4] It applies

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[1] *Congressional Rec. 62d. Cong., 2 sess.*, Vol. 48, Pt. 10, p. 9923. See also pp. 5661–5663.

[2] W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 10, 11.

[3] J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, XII., 218.

[4] E. Root, *Addresses in Int. Subjects*, p. 117.

to the occupation or use of territory in the Western Hemisphere to the overthrow or exclusion of an American Government, or to the danger of the United States. Hence, the principle announced by Monroe as a measure of self-protection necessarily and by fair implication included within its general terms all measures looking to the prevention of all extension of the political system of any non-American nation, and of all acquisition or occupation of territory by any such nation, if it endangered the peace or safety of the United States. It, therefore, included those manifestations appearing in the later application of the doctrine referred to which are improperly called enlargements of the doctrine or extensions of its meaning.

C. The Monroe Doctrine a Guaranty of Protection to Spanish America.

It has been urged frequently and particularly by the representatives of Spanish-American nations that the Monroe Doctrine extended such a guaranty of protection to those nations, that almost upon the mere request of a South American nation the United States ought to go to war if necesary to prevent any foreign nation, American as well as European, from interfering in any way with such Spanish-American nations.[1]

At the time of the original proclamation, there was undoubtedly a great element of sympathy for the South American nations, but it is not that sympathy which was the basis of the doctrine. It is solely the safety of the United States which constituted such basis. The doctrine offers, and was intended to offer, no such guaranty. It is an individual policy of the United States designed and intended solely for its own protection. Except as stated,

> "It has not otherwise any relation to the affairs of either American or European States. In good conduct or bad, observance of rights or violations of them, agreement or controversy, injury or reprisal, coercion or war, the United States finds no warrant in the Monroe Doctrine for interference."[2]

The Panama Congress, called in 1826, undoubtedly failed because of the attitude of the United States of distinct opposition to giving any such pledge to the Spanish-American nations.[3]

Secretary of State Hay said with reference to Venezuela, and it applies to all similar cases, that the United States, while it

> "regretted that European Powers should use force against Central and South American Countries, could not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered

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[1] J. H. Latané, *The U. S. and Latin America*, pp. 326–327.

[2] E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 117.

[3] *Am. St. Pap. For. Rel.*, V., 834–905: Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 416.

by their subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated."[1]

President Roosevelt, speaking of this matter in his annual message of December 3, 1901, said:

"We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power."[2]

Secretary of State Olney in his dispatch of July 20, 1895, to Bayard, set forth most clearly the negative phases of the Monroe Doctrine, as follows:

"It does not establish any general protectorate by the United States over other American states. It does not relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed by international law, nor prevent any European Power directly interested from enforcing such obligation or from inflicting merited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate any interference in the internal affairs of any American State or in the relations between it and other American States. It does not justify any attempt on our part to change the established form of government of any American State or to prevent the people of such State from altering that form according to their own will and pleasure."[3]

Henry Clay in discussing this phase of the question said,

"The declaration must be regarded as having been voluntarily made, and not as conveying any pledge or obligation, the performance of which foreign nations have a right to demand."[4]

D. The Inconsistent Application of the Monroe Doctrine.

In connection with the assertion that the Monroe Doctrine has been changed, the charge is also made that the United States has not always applied or enforced the doctrine, but has on some occasions ignored circumstances of a nature appropriate for resort to it. From this it is argued that the doctrine cannot be a fixed or permanent political policy of the United States. The following examples are cited in support of such argument.

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[1]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Sub.*, p. 112.

[2]J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, pp. 6662–6663: Moore, *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI., 595, 596.

[3]Olney to Bayard, July 20, 1895: *Sen. Ex. Doc. 31, 54th Cong. 1st. sess. 4.*

[4]Clay to Forbes, U. S. Minister to Buenos Ayres, Jan. 3, 1828, XII. *MS. Inst. U.S. Min. 49.*

(a) Great Britain and the Falkland Islands.

In 1824, Buenos Ayres seized the Falkland Islands, off the coast of Patagonia, declaring them to be part of that republic. Great Britain then occupied the Islands, declaring that they had been British possessions for some sixty years. In spite of the contention of Buenos Ayres that Great Britain's act was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States recognized British sovereignty over the Islands.

(b) Great Britain, Italy, Germany and Venezuela (1902).

In July, 1902, Great Britain and Germany brought claims against Venezuela, and upon her refusing to recognize then, or to agree upon a common tribunal to pass on them, these European Powers proclaimed and carried out a pacific blockade "in reprisal," seizing and sinking some Venezuelan gunboats. Venezuela finally agreed to the validity of the claims and offered to arbitrate the amounts. Great Britain and Italy, who had joined in the enterprise, were satisfied and discontinued the reprisal program, Germany refusing so to do. Until President Roosevelt brought pressure to bear against Germany, as heretofore related, the United States took no action relative to the situation so far as the Allied Powers were concerned.

As has been stated, the Monroe Doctrine is in the interest of the United States and of no other nation. It is, therefore, within the discretion of the United States to say when any given situation constitutes a menace to their peace and safety. It is reasonable to assume that every instance of pressure brought to bear on a Spanish-American nation by a foreign power does not constitute such a menace. Hence the United States are not required to apply the doctrine on every occasion, but may refrain from doing so if the occasion is not considered a real menace.

In the Falkland Islands episode, the United States recognized a title of Great Britain, acquired many years before. It was, therefore, not a question of a new venture by Great Britain, and as was said later by Secretary Bayard,

> "It is not seen that the Monroe Doctrine . . . has any application to the case."[1]

With reference to the Venezuelan incident President Roosevelt said that the Monroe Doctrine was not intended to prevent European nations from collecting their just claims, but applied only to permanent acquisitions. Inasmuch as Germany and Great Britain denied any such intention and the latter nation's actions supported that denial, there was no need of invoking the principle. However, when Germany's attitude later showed that her intentions were in all probability other

[1]Bayard to Quesada, March 18, 1886—*MS. Notes to Arg. Rep.*, VI., 256.

than she had stated, Roosevelt immediately brought pressure to bear on Germany and that nation discontinued its objectionable activities. Just as the Doctrine asserts no right of the United States to control the sovereignty of other American nations, so it asserts no obligation on the part of the United States to hold the South and Central American nations harmless against foreign powers, and asserts no obligation to such foreign powers to police any South American or Central American nation.[1]

E. The Monroe Doctrine and the Territorial Expansion of the United States.

It is frequently stated that the Monroe Doctrine has in some way been violated or extended beyond its intent by the expansion of the territorial limits of the United States into the Caribbean Sea, into Central America and into the Pacific Ocean. It is argued that the possession of Porto Rico, of the Panama Canal Zone, of the Virgin Islands and of the Philippines controvert the Doctrine.[2]

It is argued that "the principles of its [Monroe Doctrine] growth will be found to be only two . . . the integrity of national territory, and . . . the preservation of popular government;"[3] that while the United States has insisted many times that the Monroe Doctrine prohibited acquisition of American territory by non-American nations, it has nevertheless refused to permit the rule "to work both ways, and forbid the further acquisition of American lands by the United States."[4] It is asserted that this is a one-sided interpretation of this feature of the Monroe Doctrine,[5] which "enables us to annex American lands at our pleasure,"[6] and which has been "utilized not only to extend the boundary of the United States southward and eastward to include parts of Mexico and Columbia and a West India Island, but to bring some islands of the Pacific under the Stars and Stripes as well."[7] All this, it is said, is, in effect, a violation of territorial integrity by the United States.

As a matter of fact the Monroe Doctrine has no relation whatever to any governmental action outside the Western hemisphere or to territorial expansion by the United States. The doctrine was intended solely as a defensive measure, and at the very time of its promulgation the United States was engaged in the process of consolidating its continental boundaries. Washington believed that the true mission of the United States was continental in its extent. He, therefore, worked unceas-

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[1]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 119.

[2]W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine;* H. Bingham, *The Monroe Doctrine an Obsolete Shibboleth.*

[3]W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 4.

[4]*Ibid*, pp. 12, 13.

[5]*Ibid*, pp. 14, 22.

[6]*Ibid*, p. 40.

[7]*Ibid*, pp. 19, 20.

ingly to secure the control of the Mississippi, the cession of the western posts by Great Britain, and generally to make the United States in fact independent.[1]

John Quincy Adams, some eight months before the message was announced, stated:

> "In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It is obvious, however, that for this event we are not yet prepared."[2]

Jefferson, in his letter to Monroe relative to the proposed message, said:

> "I candidly confess that I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting addition which could ever be made to our system of states."[3]

When Mr. Monroe was sent to France as envoy in 1794, his very specific instructions contained the following:

> "Among the great events with which the world is now teeming, there may be an opening for France to become instrumental in securing to us the free navigation of the Mississippi. Spain may, perhaps, negotiate a peace, separate from Great Britain, with France. If she does, the Mississippi may be acquired through this channel, especially if you contrive to have our mediation in any manner solicited."[4]

Later, Monroe was sent to France by Jefferson to negotiate with Livingston the purchase of Louisiana, in which transaction, as events have proved, he was eminently successful.[5] In 1804, as Envoy to Spain, Monroe endeavored to secure the cession of all Spain's possessions east of the Mississippi, but failed.[6]

During the administration of his predecessor, West Florida had been occupied by the United States, and in pursuance of a Presidential message, Congress expressed its opposition to any Spanish transfer of that territory to any other nation,[7] and during Monroe's first administration in 1819, the cession of Florida by Spain was finally negotiated.[8]

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[1] H. C. Lodge, *George Washington*, II., 133, 162–164, 215.

[2] J. Q. Adams to Nelson, April 28, 1823; *House Ex. Doc.*, 121, 32nd *Cong. 1 sess.*, 6: *Br. & For. S. Papers* XLIV., 138: Moore, *Digest of Int. Law*, I., 583.

[3] Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 24, 1823, Ford's, *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, X., 277, 278.

[4] D. C. Gilman, *James Monroe*, p. 48.

[5] *Ibid*, pp. 78–95.

[6] D. C. Gilman, *James Monroe*, pp. 98–99.

[7] *American State Papers, For. Rel.*, III., 571.

[8] D. C. Gilman, *James Monroe*, p. 146.

President Polk in his annual message of December 2, 1845, with reference to this point and the bearing of the Monroe doctrine upon it, stated that,

> ". . . We must ever maintain the principle that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny. Should any portion of them, constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition. We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might disturb the 'balance of power' which they may desire to maintain upon this continent."[1]

In view of the statements from the persons who had so much to do with the enunciation of the Doctrine, it is absurd to say that the doctrine was bilateral; that it forbade non-American nations to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere and at the same time forbade the United States from extending their borders in any way.

The Monroe Doctrine, however, does not in any way justify, nor was it intended to justify, intervention in the internal affairs of any of the nations of Central or of South America. This is made very clear by the attitude of John Quincy Adams with reference to the recognition of Brazil in 1824. If the doctrine, with the formulation of which Adams had so much to do in December 1823, was intended to provide for, or to justify such interference, it is certain that in May, 1824, that same doctrine would have been made use of to justify a refusal to recognize the independence of Brazil, a monarchy amid republics. Brazil through a revolution established its independence but set up a monarchy rather than a republic. Considerable opposition was aroused in the United States to the recognition of that form of government in America. Adams, however, argued that such interference in the internal affairs of Brazil was contrary to American policy,[2] and Brazil was accordingly recognized on May 26, 1824.

The Monroe Doctrine claims no right upon the part of the United States in any way to control the sovereign rights of any American nation. Such incidents as are offered in proof of the allegation that our government has coerced other weaker American nations if examined show clearly that any rights asserted by the United States against such other nations were those of an equal and not of a superior.[3] In these assertions of right which exist in every sovereign state, the Monroe Doctrine was in no way concerned.

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[1] J. D. Richardson *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, pp. 2248–2249.

[2] W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 115–116.

[3] E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 116.

In instances such as the Venezuelan controversy with the Allied Powers in 1902, the initial "intervention" of the United States was rather under the Hague Convention right or obligation of "rendering the offices of good fellowship."[1] The United States under this provision has frequently offered its services in the settlement of disputes between American nations.

As a result of this, and of the misunderstanding as to its basis, it has been asserted that the United States has become the great American "schoolmaster" to all the South and Central American nations. This feeling is rather prevalent in South America where those who feel that way, either fail or refuse to distinguish between the Monroe Doctrine and the course of action by the United States of which they complain. It matters not whether the cry of "Yankee Imperialism" by South Americans, is or is not justified, the Monroe Doctrine is in no way involved.

This feeling of resentment is, however, directed against the Monroe Doctrine as being "patronizing" or "menacing."[2] It has undoubtedly been fostered by the Canning myth,[3] which has been carefully nourished in South America to the effect that it was Canning who prevented Spain from subduing her American colonies, and hence that it was Great Britain, and not the United States, that brought about the independence of the Spanish-American nations, when, as a matter of fact, Great Britain did not recognize any of these nations until two years after the United States had done so.

It is interesting to note that while this cry of "School Master" is raised, at the same time the cry is heard from non-American nations that all the bandit chiefs of South and Central America conduct their marauding expeditions as they will, and when threatened with punishment, answer with the counter threat that the Monroe Doctrine will overwhelm such threatening nation if it does not let the marauder conduct his business without interference.[4] In one breath it is said that the United States is too much interested to suit South America and in the next, that South America is too much interested in the protection of the United States. Both claims, however, have this common basis, *viz.*, that those who make them want to see the power of the United States to protect itself greatly diminished.

President Roosevelt's message of December 6, 1904, is frequently quoted as a justification for this South American fear of this country, but in that message the President merely stated that,

> "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may

[1]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 119.

[2]George H. Blakeslee, *A New Basis Needed for the Monroe Doctrine*, 1913, *North Am. Rev.*, CXCVIII., 779–789.

[3]C. H. Sherrill, *Modernizing he Monroe Doctrine*, p. 87.

[4]*Is the Monroe Doctrine a Bar to Civilization?* by "An American Business Man," 1903, *North Am. Rev.*, CLXXVI., 525.

in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. . . .

"We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations.[1]

This is thoroughly sound in principle and independently of the Monroe Doctrine, as stated in the first chapter, rests upon the right of self-protection, and is, in no sense, a threat to South or Central America. President Roosevelt made this amply clear in his message of December 5, 1905, in which he said,

"There are certain essential points which must never be forgotten as regards the Monroe Doctrine. In the first place we must as a nation make it evident that we do not intend to treat it in any shape or way as an excuse for aggrandizement on our part at the expense of the republics to the South. We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly government has anything to fear from us. . . ."[2]

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[1] J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, pp. 7051–7054.

[2] *Ibid*, p. 7357.

CHAPTER X.—THE FUTURE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The future of the Monroe Doctrine in effect must resolve itself into one of two following policies.

A. Its absolute abandonment.

B. Its continued assertion and maintenance, by the United States acting alone.

The query naturally presents itself as to what is to be the future of the Monroe Doctrine. Some authors say that the doctrine which was

> "the sine qua non of American public policy in the nineteenth century, is fast taking the aspect, in this twentieth century of the *bête noire* or the Frankenstein of the Republic which called it into existence."[1]

According to some writers, the future holds approximately eight possible "solutions" of the "problem" raised by the "present status" of the Monroe Doctrine.[2]

These solutions may be classified as follows:

1. Reduction of its interpretation to the literal phraseology of President Monroe.
2. Its support by a concert of powers.
3. Its support by an "A.B.C." alliance.
4. Its support by the Pan-American nations.
5. Its international recognition.
6. Its submission to the "Supra National" jursidiction of
   (a) The Hague Court of Arbitration or of Arbitral Justice.
   (b) The League of Nations.
7. Its absolute relinquishment.
8. Its continued assertion and maintenance by the United States alone.

The first "solution" is based on the assumption that the doctrine has been enlarged and no longer represents the principles announced by President Monroe. It is suggested that its interpretation be restricted to the prevention, (a) of conquest or colonization by European Powers, and (b) of restoration of monarchy in Central or in South America. As has been stated, the doctrine has never been changed or expanded to include any principles other than those contained in Monroe's message. Conditions and circumstances may have changed, and the manner of applying the principles enunciated may have changed with them, but the fundamental principle of preventing foreign nations from influencing the future of the various nations of the American continents to the danger of the peace and safety of the United States has ever been the same. The very dangers which the Holy Alliance held for the United States still threaten

[1] W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, p. 1.

[2] W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 42–124.

it, whatever forms they may asume. Colonization and Absolutism assume very many forms. "Peaceful penetration" in all its subtle phases is more menacing than avowed colonization by reason of its very indirectness. "Claims, financial and otherwise, of European Powers against weaker nations of this hemisphere present a problem no less pressing and no less dangerous" than the problems of 1823.[1]

Imperialism, however described, whether in the euphonious terminology of "Commonwealth" or "Empire" is just as dangerous to republicanism today as it was in 1823, when it was labelled "Legitimacy," and "Holy Alliance." "Eternal Vigilance is the price of Liberty." The advocates of "compression" base their argument upon false premises, and their conclusions are necessarily unsound.

The second, third,[2] and fourth[3] "solutions" are predicated upon alliances with foreign nations, which alliances, if the doctrine is to be permanent, must necessarily be permanent also. Such alliances would be absolutely contrary to the fundamental principle of American foreign policy announced by Washington and adhered to ever since, *viz.*, that of avoiding permanent alliances with foreign nations. This has become so firmly planted in the national character that even to suggest abandoning it is almost equivalent to suggesting national suicide.[4] The results of the national election of 1920 are a sufficient indication of the way in which the country at large regards such alliances with foreign powers, whether actual or apparent, and whether temporary or permanent.

The fifth "solution" rests upon the suggestion that inasmuch as certain powers are supposed to threaten the United States, a treaty should be made with them, under which, and in consideration of the United States giving "*suitable quid pro quo*—such as the Philippines, or tariff concession," such powers would agree to recognize the binding force of the doctrine.[5] Nothing, however, would be gained by such a step because if at any time any of such powers believed it to be for its interest to avoid the doctrine, and believed itself powerful enough, no such agreement would protect the United States. On the other hand, if they were not powerful enough to make such an attempt, lack of power and not the treaty would be the deterrent. The United States then, apart from the undignified bargaining to maintain a self-protective measure, has more to gain by

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[1]R. D. Armstrong, *Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Abandoned?* 10 *Am. Journal of Int. Law*, p. 77.

[2]G. H. Blakeslee, *A New Basis Needed for the Monroe Doctrine*, 1913 *No. Am. Rev.*, CXCVIII, 779–789. *Is the Monroe Doctrine a Bar to Civilization?* by "An American Business Man," 1903 *No Am. Rev.* CLXXVI.

[3]R. D. Armstrong, *Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Abandoned?* 10 *Am. Journ. Int. Law.*

[4]C. H. Sherrill, *Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 105, 112, 113, 121, 133.

[5]W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine.*

maintaining its traditional policy of no permanent alliances, and looking to its own resources for its preservation.

The sixth "solution" goes further than the others, suggesting in euphonious terms that the "United States take another grand and noble stride along the path of the new internationalism, and place its Pan-American problem . . . in the hands of the entire family of nations represented by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague,"[1] or place it in the hands of the League of Nations.[2] In other words it is suggested that the United States submit to the determination of other agencies than itself the absolute control of the doctrine, and that the doctrine cease to be solely American and that it have a world basis.[3]

Such a step would amount to an admission that the self-preservation and self-protection of the United States, so far as it rested upon the future affairs of the American Continents, were no longer to be a matter solely for the United States to pass upon, and so far it would be a waiver of the right of self protection. The fundamental right to national self-preservation, recognized *in toto* as to all other nations would be denied, or at least considerably restricted as to the United States.

When the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were held, and the peace conventions were under discussion, the United States specifically reserved the Monroe Doctrine from the operation of these conventions.[4] The question of submitting the administration of the Monroe doctrine to the Hague, therefore, has been considered already. On both occasions it was determineed that the interests of the United States prohibited any such submission.

The reasons for such refusal are even stronger to-day than then, particularly in view of the attitude of the United States toward the League of Nations Covenant. There was room for argument that the provision of that Covenant reserved to the United States the jurisdiction over the doctrine, but the United States Senate insisted upon a more specific reservation, and the people of the country, not satisfied with the Covenant even with that reservation and others, by ballot in the national election of 1920, refused to become a party to that Covenant.

All suggestions of securing international support, or international recognition for the doctrine are beside the point. Whatever effect such action might give has already been secured to this country. When the powers represented at the second Hague Conference recognized our reservation as to the

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[1]W. I. Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 43, 44.

[2]World Peace Foundation, *A League of Nations*, I. No. 5, pp. 253–265.

[3]C. H. Levermore, *World Court*, Sept. 1917.

[4]Holl's, *Peace Conference at The Hague*, pp. 477, 531; W. M. Malloy, *Treaties, Conventions, etc. of the U. S. 1776–1909* II. 2032: A. B. Hart *The Monroe Doctrine*, pp. 213, 214: Moore, *Princ. of Am. Diplomacy* p. 261.

Monroe Doctrine,[1] they in effect recognized our right to make such a reservation, and in reality to assert the doctrine against the world. If that Hague recognition will not control such foreign nations, no other written memorandum will have greater weight.

As the doctrine is based upon the right of self-protection, it cannot possibly be changed to a joint declaration with any other states American, European, or Asiatic. Similar declarations by such powers might be made, based upon a similar right of self-protection inherent in such other states. Anything other than this would necessarily be an alliance and entirely hostile to American traditions.[2]

Lord Bryce argues that the Monroe Doctrine,

> "was originally delivered as announcing a restriction or limitation which America proposed to place on her own action. She would not interfere in the wars and alliances of the Old World and she expected that in return the states of the Old World would not interfere with the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. . . .
>
> "Monroe's policy, which was also Washington's, of holding aloof from European complications was long maintained, and wisely maintained, by America, but the current of events has been too strong to make it possible to stand apart any longer. The whole world has now become one, and must remain one for the purposes of politics. No great nation can stand out.
>
> "Thus the Monroe Doctrine in its old form may seem to have disappeared; for the counterpart to the exclusion of the European Powers from interfering with the freedom of American states was the abstention of America from interference in European affairs."[3]

Lord Bryce, in effect, contends that the United States by participating in the World War sacrificed whatever right this country may have had to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. He argues speciously that we practically *agreed* not to interfere in European affairs if Europe would not interfere in American affairs, and that inasmuch as we did intervene in European affairs by participation in the World War, the *agreement* was terminated.

The premises of this argument are wholly unsound. There is nothing historically to justify the conclusion that President Monroe was laying a restriction upon this country. All the facts point to the opposite conclusion, that the United States asserted the principle as a matter of self-protection and in spite

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[1]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 109.

[2]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 120.

[3]*The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations,—The Nation*, Dec. 13, 1917.

of the opposition of foreign nations thereto. Lord Bryce's conclusion, therefore, is wholly unwarranted.

The seventh "solution" is more courageous than the others in that it argues that the doctrine has been outgrown, has no application whatever at the present time, is not worth while, "is an *ignis fatuus*,"[1] devotion to which is "mere slavery to rhetoric and sentiment"[2], and that it should be abandoned as an "obsolete shibboleth."[3] It is in reality the only alternative to the eighth "solution," that of the United States maintaining the doctrine singly.

The problem of national self-protection has not materially changed from the time of Monroe's mesage to the present. To abandon the doctrine now would be to leave South and Central America open to the territorial ambitions of the European and Asiatic powers. The treaty of Versailles, following the World War, made it clear that the great world powers are as greedy for territory now as they ever were.[4] "The spirit of colonial expansion still exists,"[5] and the abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine would really be an open invitation to such Powers to secure, or to increase their foothold in the Americas. The control of the Caribbean Sea, and of the Panama Canal would follow. The very dangers which threatened in 1823, and which called forth the enunciation of the Doctrine would overwhelm the United States.[6]

The people of this country,

> "have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our Civil War to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. They realize that had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. . . ."[7]

It has been well said that,

> "Nothing but the . . . Monroe Doctrine, has . . . prevented the acquisition of territory in South America and in

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[1]Sydney Brooks, 76 *Fortnight Rev.*, p., 1021.

[2]J. B. Henderson, Jr., *Am. Diplo. Questions*, p. 293.

[3]H. Bingham, *The Monroe Doctrine—An Obsolete Shibboleth, Atlantic Monthly*. June 1913.

[4]J. B. Angell. *The European Concert and the Monroe Doctrine, Harvard Grad. Mag.* XIV. 23.

J. Bryce, *The Monroe Doctrine and a League of Nations* in *The Nation*, Dec. 13, 1917.

[5]R. D. Armstrong *Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Abandoned?* 10. *Am. Jour. Int. Law*, 84.

[6]*Ibid*, 77–78.

[7]Olney to Bayard July 20, 1895, *Sen. Ex. Doc. 54th Cong., 1 sess.* p. 4.

the neighborhood of the Panama Canal in recent years by certain nations of Europe."[1]

The Monroe Doctrine "cannot become obsolete while our republic endures."[2] It has become an unceasingly vital and compelling policy for this country.[3]

The Monroe Doctrine,

> "Like the independence of this country, it is a question of fact and not of law. The independence of this country is unquestioned, because, having declared it, we compelled the world to recognize it. In the same way we have always acted on the declaration of Mr. Monroe as the guiding principle of our foreign policy. . . .
>
> "We declare the Monroe Doctrine to be a principle which we believe essential to the honor, the safety, the interests of the United States. We declare it as a statement of fact, and we must have it recognized, because we sustain and support it, and we can no more permit it to be a matter of discussion with other nations than we can afford to discuss with them our national welfare or our forms of government. It embodies for us the same principle as the balance of power so jealously maintained by the nations of Europe. They will not allow that to be disturbed, and we hold to our balance of power with equal tenacity."[4]

From the time of President Monroe's announcement to the present time, a period of about ninety-eight years, this country has been engaged in but three foreign wars, the Mexican, the Spanish and the World War. During that same period Europe has beheld at least seventeen wars, an average of one new war for approximately every four years. The Monroe Doctrine by keeping European powers from the Western Hemisphere has tended toward a long continued peace. To abandon it now would be to welcome Europe's almost chronic warfare.

The Monroe Doctrine was intended then, as a purely defensive measure, for the sole purpose of securing the peace and safety of this country. It was designed to prevent any danger from non-American nations by reason of the possession or occupation of territory thereafter, or the interference with the internal affairs of any American nation. It was based upon this country's right of self-preservation. The principle announced in the Monroe Doctrine, therefore, by fair implication, if

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[1]H. Holt, *Independent*, LXI, 1119.
F. Snow, *Treaties & Topics in Am. Diplomacy*, p. 423.

[2]Pres. Cleveland's Message of Dec. 17, 1895, J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, pp. 8088–6090.

[3]E. Root, *Addresses on Int. Subjects*, p. 106.

[4]H. C. Lodge, Speech in Senate, Dec. 30, 1895, *Cong. Rec. 54 Cong. 1st. Sess.* p. 419–420.

not by words apply to any occupation of American territory, temporary or permanent, direct or indirect, by any non-American power, which the United States believes to endanger the peace or safety of this country. To permit the temporary occupation of custom houses, or of ports, by non-American powers, to enforce payment of debts, or for any other reason, as stated by President Roosevelt, is very inadvisable, for such temporary occupation might very easily turn into a permanent occupation.[1]

The Monroe Doctrine cannot, then, be abandoned, but must continue to hold its position in the foreign policy of the United States. The avoidance of permanent or entangling alliances with foreign nations and the absolute prevention of any direct or indirect interference upon the part of non-American nations in the political affairs of American nations must still be our policy. The United States must not only assert the Monroe Doctrine, but also enforce it, eliminating conditions which are provocative of aggression, as well as opposing actual aggression.[2] No other policy has yet been suggested which compares in safety with that doctrine so ably worked out, and adopted by the early fathers, whose wisdom and statesmanship, viewed through the years, seem inspired.

As President Roosevelt said,

> "Our people intend to abide by the Monroe Doctrine and to insist upon it as the one sure means of securing the peace of the Western Hemisphere."[3]

It is the one sure means for the preservation of the United States and for the preservation of liberty and republicanism, for as was so eloquently expressed by Washington in his inaugural address,

> ". . . the preservation of the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered perhaps as *deeply*, as *finally*, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people."[4]

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[1]Message of Feb. 15, 1905. *Confidential Ex. V., 58 Cong., 3d Sess.;* Moore *Dig. of Int. Law*, VI, 518–528.

[2]R. D. Armstrong, *Should the Monroe Doctrine be Modified or Abandoned*, p. 97.

[3]Roosevelt's *Annual Message*, Dec. 3, 1901, J. D. Richardson *Messages and Papers of the President*, pp. 6662–6663.

[4]Washington's First Inaugural. J. D. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, I., p. 53.

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